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RACISM IN THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY* 
ANDREA FREEMAN** 
In a social and financial climate characterized by deep racial and 
socioeconomic divide, racism against credit card applicants and 
consumers is a core piece of the systemic inequality that perpetuates 
dramatic disparities in wealth, employment, health, and education. 
Over several decades, credit cards have evolved into an essential 
tool for lower- and middle-class families to maintain financial 
stability through strategic balancing between debt and disposable 
income. Now, without a credit card, many households cannot 
manage to meet the basic needs of their families. Credit card 
companies take advantage of this reality, imposing exploitative fees, 
interest rates, and other conditions on consumers who have no 
choice but to use the companies’ products. Even worse, the 
companies do so in a racially discriminatory way, burdening Black 
and Latino customers with the worst credit card terms, often 
unrelated to credit risk. This type of consumer racism dates back to 
the Reconstruction era and reflects an unbroken chain of laws and 
policies cementing racial economic inequality. Social norms and 
stereotypes make the resulting inequality appear cultural and 
personal instead of systemic and structural. 
This Article is the first to apply a critical race theory analysis to the 
problem of racism against credit card consumers. After describing 
the role that history and stereotyping play in allowing credit card 
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corporations to discriminate against consumers, it identifies fatal 
flaws in the two laws designed to address racial discrimination and 
inequality in credit, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the 
Community Reinvestment Act. It then proposes amendments to the 
Consumer Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act based 
on rehabilitative reparations theory and slavery disclosure laws that 
would require credit card companies to make significant 
investments into the communities they harm.  
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INTRODUCTION 
I’m Kan, the Louis Vuitton Don 
Bought my mom a purse, now she Louis Vuitton Mom 
I ain’t play the hand I was dealt, I changed my cards 
I prayed to the skies and I changed my stars 
I went to the malls and I balled too hard 
‘Oh my god, is that a Black Card?’ 
I turned around and replied, why yes, but I prefer the term 
African American Express 
Kanye West, Last Call1 
When Karyn Morton applied for a Capital One credit card online, 
the company’s website offered her two cards based on information 
gathered from a data mining company after Karyn clicked once on the 
company’s website.2 To its credit, Capital One accurately identified 
Karyn as a Black, Detroit homeowner who reads major metropolitan 
newspapers and watches the NAACP Image Awards.3 But Capital One 
also got a lot wrong. It assumed that Karyn was over sixty-five years old 
and retired and that she had no children and some high school 
education.4 In fact, Karyn was thirty-three years old, had a five-year-old 
child and a law degree, and earned a salary three times higher than 
Capital One predicted.5 Based on the algorithm that assessed Karyn, 
Capital One classified her in its “City Roots” segment and showed her 
two credit cards.6 Both cards sought to lure her in with a zero interest, 
six-month “teaser” rate.7 After half a year, the interest rate shot up to 
either 24.9% or 13.9%.8 
In contrast, analyzing Thomas Burney after he clicked once, Capital 
One correctly labeled him as a White college graduate who skis but 
predicted a salary higher than his actual one.9 The company’s data 
 
 1. KANYE WEST, Last Call, on THE COLLEGE DROPOUT (Roc-A-Fella Records 2004). 
 2. See One Smart Cookie: Interactive Graphic, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704017904575409021400239454 [https://perma
.cc/6SE8-ES2M (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. The segment into which a consumer is categorized determines which cards they 
will be shown. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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software classified Thomas in its “God’s Country” segment and offered 
him a card with a relatively low 11.9% interest rate.10 
This type of discrimination against credit card applicants through 
algorithms and data mining is an unregulated, but increasingly common, 
phenomenon.11 Further, this example of discrimination and the ones that 
follow demonstrate ubiquitous racism against credit card consumers in 
settings that include an applicant’s initial inquiry, retail shopping with 
credit, and the collection of unpaid bills. Collectively, they illustrate the 
hostile climate in which Black and Latino consumers interact with credit 
and the need for significant reforms to industry practices, law and policy, 
and social attitudes in order to alter this environment. 
In February 2015, three Black women, Kimmell McIntosh, Maxine 
Henry, and Melanie Henry, were enjoying a girls’ day out birthday 
celebration at Brooklyn’s Massage Envy Spa when several New York 
Police Department (“NYPD”) officers disrupted their day by entering 
the spa to question them.12 The officers then hauled the women into the 
station to detain them on suspicion of credit card fraud.13 A spa 
employee had incorrectly reported that the women used a stolen credit 
card because the card’s number was very close to another client’s card, 
but the officers failed to check for this simple mistake before making 
their dramatic and unnecessary bust.14 Outraged by the officers’ 
assumptions of their criminality, the women subsequently planned to 
bring a suit against NYPD and the spa for false arrest and racial 
profiling.15 
Similarly, in 2013, Robert Brown, star of the HBO series Treme, 
bought a $1,350 Movado watch at Macy’s for his mother as a graduation 
present.16 After he made the purchase, NYPD officers loudly accused 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, COMM. ACM, May 
2013, at 44, 50–52 (analyzing advertisement text next to Internet searches and finding that 
Black-identifying names generated ads suggestive of an arrest at a higher rate than White-
identifying names). 
 12. Keldy Ortiz & Reuven Blau, African-American Women to Sue NYPD After They 
Were Accused of Using a Stolen Credit Card, Arrested, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 12, 2015, 2:30 
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/black-women-sue-false-arrest-birthday-party-
article-1.2146258 [https://perma.cc/8PG3-QRBC]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. Similarly, police officers institutionalized Kamilah Brock, a Black woman who 
truthfully claimed that she was a banker with her own BMW. Geenius at Wrok, A Black 
Woman Says She’s a Banker? She Must Be Insane, DAILY KOS (Mar. 24, 2015, 4:48 PM), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/03/24/1373087/-A-Black-Woman-Says-She-s-a-Banker-
She-Must-Be-Insane [https://perma.cc/A6L4-AHR8]. 
 15. See Ortiz & Blau, supra note 12. 
 16. Susanna Kim & Gillian Mohney, Black Actor Alleges ‘Nationwide Pattern’ of 
Profiling in 2nd Suit Against Macy’s, ABC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com
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him of credit card theft, handcuffed him, paraded him through the 
crowded Macy’s store, and detained him.17 In response, Brown filed a 
class action suit against Macy’s for racial profiling, which the parties 
settled for an undisclosed amount.18 
In the same year, four NYPD officers disguised in plain clothes 
stopped and accused twenty-one-year-old Black nursing student Kayla 
Philips of credit card fraud in the middle of the street, three blocks away 
from Barneys, where she had just purchased a long-coveted $2,500 
orange suede Celine purse after cashing a tax return.19 Barneys settled 
her case for $525,000 and promised to stop discriminating against Black 
and Latino customers.20 This incident came on the heels of a lawsuit filed 
by eighteen-year-old Trayon Christian against Barneys and the NYPD.21 
After Christian purchased a Ferragamo belt for $349, undercover NYPD 
officers followed him from the store, claimed his card was a fake, and 
detained him in a holding cell.22 Christian eventually received a $45,000 
settlement from the city.23  
These incidents inspired protests and captured media attention, 
particularly in the wake of Oprah Winfrey’s “shopping while Black” 
experience of racial discrimination in Switzerland, where a store clerk 
refused to show her a crocodile purse because it was too expensive.24 
 
/Business/black-actor-alleges-nationwide-pattern-profiling-2nd-suit/story?id=20880469 [https://
perma.cc/XX3T-WS3D]. 
 17. Rande Iaboni, HBO Star Files Lawsuit Against NYPD, Macy’s, Cites Racial Profiling, 
CNN (Nov. 14, 2013, 8:21 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/13/justice/hbo-star-lawsuit/ 
[https://perma.cc/4GRZ-9SSN]. 
 18. Class Action Complaint at 1, Brown v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 13 CV 8092 (S.D.N.Y. 
November 13, 2013), 2013 WL 6003108; Order, Brown v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 13 CV 8092 
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014), ECF No. 23 (order recognizing settlement agreement); Julia Lull, 
‘Treme’ Actor Settles Racial Profiling Lawsuit Against Macy’s, NYC, CNN (July 19, 2014, 1:55 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/19/justice/hbo-star-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/S69L-THB4]. 
 19. Tina Moore & Ginger Adams Otis, Another Black Barneys Shopper Accused of 
Credit Card Fraud After Buying $2,500 Purse: Claim, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 24, 2013, 8:02 
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/black-barneys-shopper-accused-buying-2g-purse-
article-1.1494855 [https://perma.cc/AV83-2W8W]. 
 20. Dominic Rushe, Barneys to Pay $525,000 in Racial Profiling Settlement, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 11, 2014, 11:14 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/11/barneys-racial-
profiling-settlement [https://perma.cc/TK5L-B3G5]. 
 21. Victoria Bekiempis, Black Student Wins $45G Settlement over Alleged Barneys 
Profiling, NYPD Stop-Frisk, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016, 4:10 AM), http://www
.nydailynews.com/new-york/manhattan/black-student-wins-45g-settlement-barneys-stop-frisk-
article-1.2502760 [https://perma.cc/2XCL-NRR3]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Order, Christian v. Barneys New York Inc., 1:14-cv-01303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan 20, 
2016); Bekiempis, supra note 21. 
 24. Nick Thompson & Diana Magnay, Oprah Winfrey Racism Row over Switzerland 
Shop Incident, CNN (Aug. 11, 2013, 10:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/09/world/oprah-
winfrey-racism-switzerland/ [https://perma.cc/K4H6-FU6V]. A shop clerk in a high-end bag 
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Despite remonstration, however, racial profiling against Black and 
Latino credit card users persists.25 It also takes place in the debt 
collection phase of credit card use.  
Maria Guadalupe Mejia’s life became fraught with anxiety when 
Portfolio Recovery Associates, a company that collects on credit card 
debt, relentlessly pursued a lawsuit against her for a $1,000 debt that 
wasn’t hers.26 Mejia, a Latina from Kansas City, Missouri, shared,  
My husband and I were already struggling just to keep the 
children fed and the lights on. The lawsuit terrified me. I feared 
they would take my house and I feared they would arrest me. I 
was very shocked that they sued me for one year and three 
months [until the court dismissed the case] even though I never 
had the credit card. And after they dismissed the case, they said 
they might sue me again.27  
A jury awarded Mejia more than $82 million in damages,28 but this type 
of compensation is rare. Most harassment from credit card debt 
collectors goes unremedied.29 Also, although there are no significant 
 
store, Trois Pomme, refused to show the celebrity a crocodile purse due to it being “too 
expensive.” Id. The day after the story aired, on his late night talk show, Conan O’Brien 
joked, “Oprah was shopping in Switzerland recently and a Swiss clerk refused to show her a 
$38,000 purse because she didn’t think Oprah could afford it. To prove a point, Oprah bought 
Switzerland.” TEAMCOCO, http://teamcoco.com/jokes/aug-12-2013-oprah-s-been-a-big-story-
lately-oprah-was-shopping-in-switzerland [https://perma.cc/Q322-LK26]. 
 25. See, e.g., Earl G. Graves, Sr., The Fight Against ‘Racial Profiling’ and ‘Shopping While 
Black’ Continues, BLACK ENTERPRISE (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.blackenterprise.com/blogs
/racial-profiling-and-shopping-while-black/ [https://perma.cc/H69A-9V9M] (“Today, African 
American consumers are tolerated, at best, and deemed suspect, at worst, by too many of the 
retail outlets that benefit from our more than $1 trillion in spending power. From world-
renowned African Americans such as Oprah Winfrey to Barneys shoppers Trayon Christian 
and Kayla Phillips, black consumers continue to be racially profiled as potential thieves, credit 
card fraudsters, or otherwise unable to legitimately afford high-end merchandise available for 
purchase.”). For a classic example of both racial profiling and legal storytelling, see PATRICIA 
J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44–51 (1991).  
 26. Dan Margolies, Jury Awards KC Woman $83 Million in Debt Collection Case, KCUR 
89.3 (May 14, 2015), http://kcur.org/post/jury-awards-kc-woman-83-million-debt-collection-
case [https://perma.cc/XW34-S5C6]; see also Anneta Konstantinides, Missouri Woman 
Awarded $83Million After Debt Collection Agency Sued Her for $1,000 and Harassed Her 
Non-Stop over a Credit Card She Never Even Owned, DAILY MAIL.COM (May 20, 2015, 9:07 
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3088875/Woman-awarded-83million-debt-
collection-agency.html [https://perma.cc/JSY5-S6LU]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Mejia, No. 1216-CV34184, 2015 WL 13106253, at 
*3 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 20, 2015); see also Margolies, supra note 26. 
 29. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: 
CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 7, 12 (2015) (reporting that, in 2014, 77 million Americans 
debts were in the process of collection and only 88,300 complaints were registered during this 
time period).  
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differences in how many times Black and White credit card users pay 
their balances late, a survey found debt collectors make harassing phone 
calls to seven out of ten Black borrowers but only five out of ten White 
borrowers.30 
In a social and financial climate characterized by deep racial and 
socioeconomic divide, racism against credit card applicants and 
consumers is a core piece of the systemic, structural inequality that 
perpetuates dramatic disparities in wealth, employment, health, and 
education. Each of the preceding stories represents one aspect of both 
the explicit and structural racism that complicates credit card use by 
consumers of color. These incidents arise from cultural misperceptions 
shaped by racial stereotyping and historical discrimination. Further, the 
attitudes and conduct of police, merchants, and bill collectors against 
consumers of color provide context for how credit corporations perceive 
and interact with non-White consumers. They also demonstrate the 
benefit of applying a critical race theory perspective to understand 
discrimination against credit card consumers and to guide the 
formulation of effective responses.31  
Over several decades, credit cards have evolved into an essential 
tool for lower- and middle-class families to maintain financial stability 
through strategic balancing between debt and disposable income. Now, 
without a credit card, many households would not be able to meet the 
basic needs of their families. These households rely on credit for basic 
subsistence as well as to cope with financial emergencies.32 Credit card 
companies take advantage of this reality, imposing exploitative fees, 
interest rates, and other conditions on consumers who have no choice 
 
 30. See Alan Pyke, Debt Collectors Hound Black Borrowers More Frequently Than White 
Ones, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 18, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2013/12/18/3079731
/debt-collectors-race/ [https://perma.cc/5H3L-SBR9].  
 31. Despite recognizing that racism against consumers of color is broad and 
comprehensive, this Article focuses mainly on how credit card companies treat Black 
consumers. 
 32. JOSÉ A. GARCÍA, DĒMOS, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET: THE RAPID 
GROWTH OF CREDIT CARD DEBT IN AMERICA 1 (2007), http://www.demos.org/sites/default
/files/publications/Demos_BorrowingEndsMeet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9SD-48KX]; MILES 
RAPOPORT & JENNIFER WHEARY, DĒMOS, RUNNING IN PLACE: WHERE THE MIDDLE 
CLASS AND THE POOR MEET 1, 8 (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications
/RunningInPlace_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYC5-7GVM]; CATHERINE RUETSCHLIN & 
DEDRICK ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, DĒMOS & NAACP, THE CHALLENGE OF CREDIT CARD 
DEBT FOR THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 1 (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites
/default/files/publications/CreditCardDebt-Demos_NAACP_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM77-
AFS8]; AMY TRAUB & CATHERINE RUETSCHLIN, DĒMOS, THE PLASTIC SAFETY NET: 
FINDINGS FROM THE 2012 NATIONAL SURVEY ON CREDIT CARD DEBT OF LOW- AND 
MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 1–2 (2012), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files
/publications/PlasticSafetyNet-Demos.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9RJ-V57E]. 
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but to use their products. Even worse, the companies do so in a racially 
discriminatory way, burdening Black and Latino customers with the 
worst credit card terms, compared to White consumers, and often 
unrelated to credit risk.  
For example, a 2008 survey found that, although Black borrowers 
carried lower balances on their cards, they paid more interest.33 
Specifically, a Black family that carried consumer debt with an average 
interest rate that made average monthly payments paid at least $100 
more in interest on the debt than an average White family, despite the 
fact that the Black family borrowed less.34 This type of consumer racism 
dates back to the Reconstruction era and reflects an unbroken chain of 
laws and policies cementing racial economic inequality.35 Social norms 
and stereotypes serve to make this inequality appear cultural and 
personal, instead of structural. 
Unfortunately, although the financial precarity caused by 
institutional and corporate racism against credit card consumers is a vital 
and urgent issue, similar to the racial disparities in the treatment of 
mortgage and home consumers that capture national attention,36 both 
the media and legal scholars have largely neglected this issue. This 
Article seeks to fill that gap. By focusing a critical race theory lens on 
predatory and discriminatory practices of the credit card industry, it 
opens the door to innovative approaches to reducing economic 
inequality. This perspective goes beyond the traditional legal formula of 
individual remedies for individual acts of discrimination by proposing 
systemic relief for communities besieged by institutionalized, structural 
racism supported by social and cultural stereotypes. 
 
 33. RUETSCHLIN & ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, supra note 32, at 8. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See infra Section I.A.  
 36. See, e.g., Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC, June 2014, at 54, 57; 
Peter Eavis, Study Strongly Links Baltimore Mortgage Denials to Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 
2015, at B3; Emily Badger, Why a Housing Scheme Founded in Racism Is Making a 
Resurgence Today, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (May 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/13/why-a-housing-scheme-founded-in-racism-is-making-a-
resurgence-today/ [https://perma.cc/74XV-9CGJ]; Jay Fitzgerald, Black, Latino Mortgage 
Rejection Rates Still High, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business
/2015/12/21/blacks-latinos-still-rejected-for-mortgages-higher-rates/kng3Kuc4v3uIK1pmDqBSjO
/story.html [https://perma.cc/22FB-AZT5]; Jeff Guo, If You’re Poor, Your Mortgage Rate Can 
Depend on the Color of Your Skin, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/12/23/if-youre-poor-your-mortgage-rate-can-depend-on-the-color-
of-your-skin/ [https://perma.cc/4FTU-BCJB]; Hamilton Nolan, There Is Still Racial 
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, GAWKER (July 19, 2016, 10:32 AM), http://gawker.com
/there-is-still-racial-discrimination-in-mortgage-lendin-1783915158 [https://perma.cc/5VU3-
ETXS]. 
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This Article is the first to apply a critical race theory analysis to the 
problem of racism against credit card consumers, using this framework 
to propose a solution grounded in rehabilitative reparations theory. 
Beginning from the premise that the credit card industry’s success 
depends on a business model that both perpetuates and exploits 
structural inequality,37 the Article explores the specific role that credit 
discrimination plays in maintaining the racial economic divide. 
Critically, it crosses the bridge between theory and practice, inviting 
regulators to make concrete, fundamental changes to consumer law that 
would simultaneously deter acts of discrimination and alter the broader 
racial economic landscape. 
The Article begins in Part I with a history of race and wealth in the 
United States that outlines the laws and policies precipitating the 
existence of a 20:1 wealth gap between White and Black Americans 
following the 2008 mortgage and financial crisis.38 This crisis likely led to 
increased dependence on credit for Black households.39 Further, 
statistically, there are racial disparities in every aspect of credit card use, 
from the application process to the terms of agreements to the need to 
 
 37. See Andrea Freeman, Payback: A Structural Analysis of the Credit Card Problem, 55 
ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 153 (2013) (“Although most economists and legal scholars view the ‘credit 
card problem’ of excessive consumer debt as one of market failure, it is in fact a story of 
overwhelming market success. Through the use of sophisticated underwriting technology, the 
credit card companies learned that consumers who are on the verge of bankruptcy represent 
their greatest source of profits. The industry responded to this information by completely 
altering its business model. Instead of seeking customers who would pay off their bills at the 
end of each month, known in the industry as convenience users or deadbeats, the companies 
began to target low-income consumers who would maintain balances from month to month, 
known as revolvers.” (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 
NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2004); then citing Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1373, 1379 (2004); then citing Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat 
Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 385–91; and then citing Adam J. Levitin, 
The Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden 
Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 317–18 (2005))); id. at 154 (“Consequently, low-
income consumers now receive credit cards with high fees and interest rates, while higher-
income consumers reap the rewards of credit card use, such as travel miles and concierge 
services. Credit card companies target vulnerable consumers for inferior products through 
tactics such as teaser rates, mass mailings of preapproved cards,	.	.	.	overly complex credit card 
agreements, and credit-card redlining. As a result of these practices, 80% of the industry’s 
profits now come from interest payments and	.	.	.	fees instead of annual and interchange fees. 
This shift represents a massive redistribution of wealth from the poor to wealthier consumers 
and corporations.” (citing U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-929, CREDIT 
CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE 
EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS 67 (2006))). 
 38. PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD 
HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS, HISPANICS 1 (2011). 
 39. See REBECCA PERRON, AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCES IN THE ECONOMY: 
RECESSION EFFECTS MORE STRONGLY FELT 22–23 (2010), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter
/econ/economyaa.pdf [https://perma.cc/NNY7-HKVU].  
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forego necessary medical treatment and abandon educational 
opportunities due to excessive debt. Part I describes the dramatically 
different experiences that White and Black households have with credit 
and the intersection of corporate conduct and structural inequality that 
accounts for these differences. Then, it explores the role that stereotypes 
about Black consumers play in creating and justifying racial disparities 
in credit. These stereotypes focus the blame for bad credit squarely on 
the individual, making legal reform and corporate responsibility appear 
both futile and unnecessary. 
Part II looks closely at the two laws designed to address racial 
discrimination and inequality in credit, the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (“ECOA”) and the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”). This 
Part investigates the legislative history behind these statutes, identifying 
the problems that the laws’ proponents sought to solve with their 
enactment. It then outlines the major substantive and procedural aspects 
of these laws, describing the weaknesses that render them unable to 
fulfill their intended purposes. Acknowledging that these laws neither 
deter nor provide effective relief for racial disparities and discrimination 
in credit, Part II then calls for a new approach to consumer credit law 
founded on the insights of critical race theory. 
Part III proposes amendments to the Consumer Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure (“CARD”) Act designed to reduce or 
eliminate racial discrimination by credit card companies, as well as to 
promote economic growth in underserved communities. Rehabilitative 
reparations theory provides the model for these proposals. Accordingly, 
Part III provides an overview of the history and philosophy of 
rehabilitative reparations theory, edifying its focus on uplifting 
communities instead of making individuals whole. Next, Part III details 
the history and success of slavery disclosure laws. These laws, which 
require certain companies to disclose their past ties with slavery, seek to 
create corporate accountability for racial harms. Part III argues for 
similar, but stronger consumer laws requiring credit card companies to 
disclose any racially discriminatory conduct and to compensate for it 
through significant investments into the harmed communities. The 
Article concludes by briefly engaging potential counter arguments to 
this proposal and acknowledging the major obstacle posed by the 
financial industry’s influence over politics. 
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I.  RACE AND CREDIT 
A. How Law and Policy Shaped Race and Wealth in the United 
States 
Analyzing modern conditions of race and credit from a critical race 
theory perspective requires delving into the economic history of race in 
the United States. This history begins with slavery and continues to the 
present, when economic inequality continues to create a high and 
captive demand for credit in Black families and individuals. This 
economic history reinforces several key critical race theory principles: 
that racism is permanent,40 subject to relief only when White interests 
converge with the interests of those subject to racial oppression;41 that 
race is a social construct designed to perpetuate White privilege;42 and 
that law is a tool implemented to define race and enforce racial 
boundaries.43 
The 20:1 wealth gap between Blacks and Whites in the United 
States is not a manifestation of cultural or individual differences, but the 
product of a long history of discriminatory laws and policies that 
inscribed racial disparities into society.44 This history began when 
 
 40. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM 12 (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL]; see also 
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
156–57 (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED] (discussing the “ideological 
hegemony” of white racism).  
 41. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education & the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522–30 (1980). 
 42. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Book Review, The Law and Economics of 
Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1759 (2003); Teresa J. Guess, The Social 
Construction of Whiteness: Racism by Intent, Racism by Consequence, 32 CRITICAL SOC. 649, 
650–51 (2006). 
 43. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 419–20 (1856) (holding that 
no Black person, whether free or enslaved, could claim U.S. citizenship and, therefore, 
enslaved persons could not petition the Court for their freedom); Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a 
Eurocentric Enterprise, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 429, 429–36 
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000) (contending that the law is “part of a 
broader cultural endeavor that attempts to promote European values and interests at the 
expense of all others”). See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (rev. ed. 2006) (arguing that current race law, while purporting to 
be “colorblind,” nevertheless perpetuates racial inequality); Laura E. Gómez, Understanding 
Law and Race as Mutually Constitutive, 8 J. SCHOLARLY PERSP. no. 8, Fall 2012, at 47, 51 
(contending that “law and race co-construct each other”).  
 44. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 38, at 1; see also Freeman, supra note 37, at 181–84 
(describing the impact of the Social Security Act and the Fair Housing Act on Blacks’ 
inability to accumulate wealth at the same rate as Whites, as well as restrictions on business 
opportunities and price and credit discrimination). See generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005) (analyzing the discriminatory impact of key laws 
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enslaved Africans replaced European indentured servants as the source 
of labor for tobacco plantations.45 The White servants’ displacement 
brought them a number of advantages, placing them higher on the social 
scale than the newly arrived Africans who, viewed as property instead of 
humans, lacked legal personhood.46 
After slavery officially ended, the exploitation of Black labor 
continued through Black Codes.47 Black Codes were criminal laws 
designed to incarcerate Blacks in order to take advantage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s exception allowing the government to impose 
forced labor on convicted criminals.48 Section 1 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment states that: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction.”49 To allow for broad discretion in arresting and 
incarcerating freed slaves, the southern states enacted Black Codes that 
attached criminal penalties, including prison time, to common activities. 
For example, a Mississippi Black Code criminalized: 
[A]ll rogues and vagabonds, idle and dissipated persons, beggars, 
jugglers, or persons practicing unlawful games or plays, runaways, 
 
including the Social Security Act, the G.I. Bill, and labor laws implementing unemployment 
benefits, a minimum wage, and union protection); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. 
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL 
INEQUALITY (2d ed. 2006) (explaining how the wealth gap between Blacks and Whites in the 
United States has evolved and presently accounts for entrenched inequality that policies 
focused on income and taxation fail to address); DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING 
RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014) (exploring how 
racial privilege is perpetuated throughout generations through residential segregation, 
nepotism, and other social practices). 
 45. See, e.g., JAMES OLIVER HORTON & LOIS E. HORTON, SLAVERY AND THE MAKING 
OF AMERICA 28–30 (2005); PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619–1877, at 7–14 (rev. 
ed. 2003). 
 46. See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM 328–37 
(photo. reprint 2003) (1975) (positing that the status of Black slaves elevated that of White 
indentured servants, informing the development of race-based slavery in the Virginia colony); 
see also Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 398–99; HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES 23–52 (1980).  
 47. E.g., St. Landry, La., An Ordinance Relative to the Police of Negroes Recently 
Emancipating Within the Parish of St. Landry, No. 35, §§	4, 8 (July 15, 1865), reprinted in S. 
EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-2, at 93–94 (1865); An Act to Amend the Vagrant Laws of the State, §	1, 
1865 Miss. Laws 90, 90; Mechanics, Artisans, and Shopkeepers, §	LXXII, 1865 S.C. Acts 279, 
279. 
 48. E.g., An Act to Amend the Vagrant Laws of the State, §	1, 1865 Miss. Laws 90, 90. See 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §	1; DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: 
THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II, at 53 
(2008); Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a 
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1015 (2002).  
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §	1. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2017) 
2017] RACISM IN THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY 1083 
common drunkards, common night-walkers, pilferers, lewd, 
wanton, or lascivious persons, in speech or behavior, common 
railers and brawlers, persons who neglect their calling or 
employment, misspend what they earn, or do not provide for the 
support of themselves or their families, or dependents, and all 
other idle and disorderly persons, including all who neglect all 
lawful business, habitually misspend their time by frequenting 
houses of ill-fame, gaming-houses, or tippling shops	.	.	.	.50 
It is difficult to think of a person who does not habitually commit at least 
one of these so-called crimes. Thus, by criminalizing such innocuous and 
prevalent conduct, Black Codes allowed states and municipalities to 
continue oppressing newly-freed slaves and restrict their access to 
potential economic opportunities. 
Further, despite the promise that freed slaves would receive forty 
acres and a mule to work their own land, the government has yet to give 
reparations to slaves or their descendants.51 Instead, the federal 
government awarded up to $300 per slave to their past owners, to 
compensate for their property losses.52 Also, although some Blacks 
continued farming, with Black land ownership peaking at 218,000 Black-
owned farms in 1910, discrimination and exclusion by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) over the following century 
resulted in that number dwindling down to 18,000 Black-owned farms by 
1992, a decline of 92%.53 Additionally, although the approximately $2 
 
 50. An Act to Amend the Vagrant Laws of the State, §	1, 1865 Miss. Laws 90, 90; JAMES 
M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 511–12 (1st ed. 
1982). 
 51. W. T. Sherman, Special Field Orders, No. 15 (Jan. 16, 1865), in 47 THE WAR OF THE 
REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND 
CONFEDERATE ARMIES 60, 60–62 (U.S. War Dep’t ed., 1985); see also GEORGE R. BENTLEY, 
A HISTORY OF THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU 100–02 (1955); PAUL SKEELS PEIRCE, III:1 THE 
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 59–61 (1904); 
Meizhu Lui, Doubly Divided: The Racial Wealth Gap, in THE WEALTH INEQUALITY 
READER 42, 44–47 (Dollars & Sense & United for a Fair Econ. eds., 2004). 
 52. Act of Apr. 16, 1862, ch. 54, §§	2–3, 12 Stat. 376, 376–77 (permitting compensation for 
former slave owners after abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia).  
 53. Chris Kromm, The Real Story of Racism at the USDA, NATION (July 23, 2010), http://
www.thenation.com/article/real-story-racism-usda/ [https://perma.cc/UPQ6-K3Z3]. The USDA 
granted its farm loans almost exclusively to White farmers, making it virtually impossible for 
Black farmers to expand to meet the subsidy requirements favoring large over small farms. 
See Jim Chen, Of Agriculture’s First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1261, 1306 
(1995); Andrea Freeman, The 2014 Farm Bill: Farm Subsidies and Food Oppression, 38 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1271, 1277 n.32 (2015) (“The first farm subsidies allowed the white 
owners of large farms to invest in machines and chemicals, leading to their growth, while small 
farms operated by blacks received no assistance in the quest to modernize. In 2007, after 
many years of documented discrimination against black and Latino farmers by the USDA and 
other federal agencies, farm owners were ninety-eight percent white.” (citations omitted)); 
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billion settlement in the ensuing landmark discrimination case against 
the USDA, Pigford v. Glickman,54 represented the largest civil rights 
settlement in United States history,55 the one-time cash payment of 
$50,000 that most plaintiffs could obtain did little to compensate for the 
losses of generations of Black farmers driven from the land.56 By 2007, 
98% of farm owners were White,57 and Blacks retained little hope of 
regaining their foothold in agriculture. 
Parallel to the decline of Black farming was the trajectory of Black 
business, which peaked in the early twentieth century in cities including 
Atlanta; Chicago; Washington, D.C.; Knoxville; New York; East St. 
Louis; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Rosewood, Florida.58 Unfortunately, 
Whites who resented Black economic success often responded to 
thriving Black communities with acts of violence.59 Perhaps the worst of 
these attacks took place in Tulsa on June 1, 1921, when bombing and 
burning completely destroyed the city’s “Black Wall Street” over the 
course of twelve hours.60 Other smaller Black business areas, however, 
such as Augusta’s Golden Blocks and Atlanta’s Auburn Avenue, 
survived into the 1950s.61 
Black Codes also contributed to the segregated economy. For 
example, South Carolina’s Black Code prohibited Blacks from 
practicing any trade except domestic or agricultural work unless a 
district court judge granted them a license to do so, a highly unlikely 
 
Madeleine Thomas, What Happened to America’s Black Farmers?, GRIST (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://grist.org/people/what-happened-to-americas-black-farmers/ [https://perma.cc/QX5Q-
U2AH].  
 54. 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 55. Id. at 95. 
 56. See Kromm, supra note 53; Thomas, supra note 53. 
 57. See Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
790, 815 (2007). 
 58. See A Moore, 8 Successful and Aspiring Black Communities Destroyed by White 
Neighbors, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (Dec. 4, 2013), http://atlantablackstar.com/2013/12/04/8-
successful-aspiring-black-communities-destroyed-white-neighbors/ [https://perma.cc/6LG5-D6PQ]. 
 59. Id. The attacks happened in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1906; Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 1921; 
Chicago in 1919; Rosewood, Florida, in 1923; Washington, D.C., in 1919; Knoxville, 
Tennessee, in 1919; New York City, New York, in 1863; and East St. Louis, Missouri, in 1917. 
Id. 
 60. See EDDIE FAYE GATES, RIOT ON GREENWOOD: THE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF 
BLACK WALL STREET 7–29 (2003) (detailing the Tulsa race riot of 1921); JAMES S. HIRSCH, 
RIOT AND REMEMBRANCE: THE TULSA RACE WAR AND ITS LEGACY 77–98 (1st ed. 2002) 
(describing the Tulsa race riots and their legacy). 
 61. See Blacks-Only Business District Thrived: Lenox Theatre Was Inspired by Jim 
Crowism, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Aug. 29, 2010, 10:25 PM), http://chronicle.augusta.com/225/2010
-08-29/blacks-only-business-district-thrived [https://perma.cc/AG76-AJBH]; Sweet Auburn 
History District, NAT’L PARK SERV.: ATLANTA, http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/atlanta/aub.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7K8K-PNVR]. 
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eventuality.62 Similarly, a Louisiana parish ordinance put severe 
limitations on Blacks’ ability to engage in gainful employment by 
declaring that 
every negro is required to be in the regular service of some white 
person, or former owner, who shall be held responsible for the 
conduct of said negro. But said employer or former owner may 
permit said negro to hire his own time by special permission in 
writing, which permission shall not extend over seven days at any 
one time. Any negro violating the provisions of this section shall 
be fined five dollars for each offence, or in default of the payment 
thereof shall be forced to work five days on the public road, or 
suffer corporeal punishment as hereinafter provided.63 
Mississippi’s Black Code required Black workers to register with local 
authorities.64  
 In 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson65 upheld the doctrine of “separate but 
equal” public accommodations, leading to the entrenchment of 
segregation into the national economy.66 This segregation compelled 
Black business owners, prohibited from buying White land, to operate 
on the margins of cities and sell to a restricted market containing only 
 
 62. Mechanics, Artisans, and Shopkeepers, §	LXXII, 1865 S.C. Acts 279, 279. 
 63. St. Landry, La., An Ordinance Relative to the Police of Negroes Recently 
Emancipating Within the Parish of St. Landry, No. 35, §§	4, 8 (July 15, 1865), reprinted in S. 
EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-2, at 93–94 (1865) (“[N]o negro shall sell, barter, or exchange any articles 
of merchandise or traffic within said parish without the special written permission of his 
employer, specifying the articles of sale, barter or traffic. Any one thus offending shall pay a 
fine of one dollar for each offence, and suffer the forfeiture of said articles, or in default of the 
payment of said fine shall work one day on the public road, or suffer corporeal punishment as 
hereinafter provided.”). See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (statement of 
Sen. Trumbull) (describing Black Codes as “laws that prevented the colored man going from 
home, that did not allow him to buy or to sell, or to make contracts; that did not allow him to 
own property; that did not allow him to enforce rights”).  
 64. An Act to Confer Civil Rights on Freedmen, and for Other Purposes, §	5, 1865 Miss. 
Laws 82, 83 (“[E]very freedman, free negro and mulatto, shall, on the second Monday of 
January, [1866], and annually thereafter, have a lawful home or employment, and shall have 
written evidence thereof, as follows, to-wit: if living in any incorporated city, town or village, a 
license from the mayor thereof; and if living outside of any incorporated city, town or village, 
from the member of the board of police of his beat, authorizing him or her to do irregular and 
job work, or a written contract	.	.	.	which licenses may be revoked for cause, at any time, by 
the authority granting the same.”).  
 65. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 66. See id. at 550–52. The inability of Blacks to participate equally with Whites in social 
activities relegated them to a fringe social and economic sphere that did not offer the same 
opportunities for economic prosperity available to White businesses that could cater to the 
more financially stable segment of the population. See LAURIE COLLIER HILLSTROM, 
DEFINING MOMENTS: PLESSY V. FERGUSON 63–69 (2013).  
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other Blacks.67 Over the same period, Jim Crow laws, enacted in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries and finally invalidated in the 1960s,68 
ensured Black subordination and the perpetuation of White privilege 
through fierce segregation of all sectors of society.69 For example, a 1904 
Oklahoma law declared: 
Any instructor who shall teach in any school, college or 
institution, where members of the white race and colored race are 
received and enrolled as pupils for instruction, shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be 
fined in any sum not less than ten dollars nor more than fifty 
dollars for each offense	.	.	.	.70 
Similarly, a 1913 North Carolina law proclaimed: 
 
 67. See JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG BLACK 
AMERICANS: A RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS 151–53 (rev. ed. 2005); 
JULIET E. K. WALKER, THE HISTORY OF BLACK BUSINESS IN AMERICA: CAPITALISM, 
RACE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP 193–96 (1st ed. 1998); see also Freeman, supra note 37, at 182–83 
(“African-American businesses were traditionally confined to African-American 
neighborhoods and catered to a mostly African-American clientele, many of whom did not 
have high levels of disposable income. Although some of these niche industries flourished, 
such as hair and beauty products (which depend for the most part on the negative societal 
images of their clientele), many African-American businesses struggled to survive, 
particularly as successful African Americans emigrated away from all-African-American 
neighborhoods. Ghettoized economies prevent financial growth for small African-American 
businesses and individual consumers, forcing them to rely on debt to meet monthly expenses.” 
(citing OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 44, at 48–51; GOOD HAIR (Chris Rock Productions & 
HBO Films 2009)). 
 68. An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Military Laws of North Carolina, ch. 47, §	1-
4852, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 82, 82; Act of May 5, 1908, ch. 77, §	6, 1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 694, 
695. After Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), held segregation in public 
schools unconstitutional, id. at 495, a line of cases and laws rendered all institutional 
segregation illegal, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (holding that 
Congress acted within its power in forbidding racial discrimination in restaurants); Johnson v. 
Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (desegregating courthouse seating); New Orleans City Park 
Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (affirming 
lower court decision that a city’s refusal to make publicly supported facilities available on an 
integrated basis to African American citizens is unconstitutional), aff’d per curiam, 358 U.S. 
54 (1958); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1955) (ruling segregation at 
public golf courses unconstitutional), vacated per curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Dawson v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386, 387–88 (4th Cir. 1955) (holding segregation at public 
beaches and bathhouses unconstitutional), aff’d per curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Browder v. 
Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (holding statutes and ordinances requiring 
segregation on public buses unconstitutional), aff’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). See 
generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§	1981–2000h-6 (2015)) (invalidating government-sponsored discrimination based on 
race, among other protected designations).  
 69. See An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Military Laws of North Carolina, ch. 47, 
§	1-4852, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 82, 82; Act of May 5, 1908, ch. 77, §	6, 1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 
694, 695.  
 70. Act of May 5, 1908, ch. 77, §	6, 1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 694, 695.  
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The white and colored militia shall be separately enrolled, and 
shall never be compelled to serve in the same organization. No 
organization of colored troops shall be permitted where white 
troops are available, and when permitted to be organized, colored 
troops shall be under command of white officers	.	.	.	.71 
The harsh effects of a racially segregated military inspired the relatively 
privileged Charles Hamilton Houston to devote his life to dismantling 
Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine.72 His determination, diligence, 
and prophetic strategizing led to Plessy’s eventual overruling by Brown 
v. Board of Education in 1954.73 
Even in the cities where some Black businesses managed to thrive, 
the majority of Blacks worked as marginalized, unskilled workers and 
agricultural laborers.74 Also, when calamities struck, such as the boll 
weevil scourge that cut Georgia’s cotton production in half between 
1914 and 192375 and the Great Depression, Blacks experienced some of 
the greatest and most sustained losses.76 Further, New Deal programs 
designed to lift the national economy out of the Depression and to 
create important protections for workers largely bypassed Blacks.77  
For example, the 1935 Social Security Act provided a safety net for 
all employees but excluded certain groups, including domestic servants 
 
 71. An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Military Laws of North Carolina, ch. 47, §	1-
4852, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 82, 82.  
 72. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); CHARLES H. 
HOUSTON: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERSHIP 1 (James L. 
Conyers, Jr. ed., 2012); José Felipé Anderson, Maryland Lawyers Who Helped Shape the 
Constitution: Father of Freedom—Charles Hamilton Houston, MD. B.J., no. 4, July/Aug. 2011, 
at 4, 6; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Wielding the Double-Edged Sword: Charles Hamilton Houston 
and Judicial Activism in the Age of Legal Realism, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17, 24 
(1998); THE ROAD TO BROWN (Larry Adelman 1990), http://newsreel.org/transcripts/roadtob
.htm [https://perma.cc/5PVU-LFKT]. 
 73. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see also CHARLES H. HOUSTON, 
supra note 72, at 126; Anderson, supra note 72, at 5; Fairfax, supra note 72, at 24; THE ROAD 
TO BROWN, supra note 72. 
 74. Edward A. Hatfield, Segregation, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Chris Dobbs ed., Jan. 
24, 2017), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/segregation [https://
perma.cc/DSE6-YNEB]. 
 75. JACKIE SHECKLER FINCH, IT HAPPENED IN ALABAMA: REMARKABLE EVENTS 
THAT SHAPED HISTORY 43–45 (1st ed. 2011); Fabian Lange, Alan L. Olmstead & Paul W. 
Rhode, The Impact of the Boll Weevil, 1892–1932, 69 J. ECON. HIST. 685, 693 (2009); Phillip 
M. Roberts, Boll Weevil, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www
.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/business-economy/boll-weevil [https://perma.cc/CSP7-R9AP]. 
 76. Hatfield, supra note 74. 
 77. E.g., Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, Pub. L. 74-271, §	210(b)(1)–(2), 49 Stat. 620, 
625 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	410(a)(3)(A)–(B) (2012)); National Labor Relations 
Act, ch. 372, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§	151–
169 (2012)).  
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and agricultural workers, where Black labor was concentrated.78 In the 
same year, the Wagner Act granted collective bargaining power to 
unions, making negotiations for fair wages possible and greatly 
expanding the middle class.79 The Act, however, allowed unions to 
exclude domestic servants and farm workers and provided no protection 
against racial discrimination in benefits including health care, job 
security, and pensions.80 The ensuing exclusion was so extreme that in 
1972 all of the 3,000 members of Los Angeles’s Steam Fitters Local 250 
labor union were reportedly White.81 
In addition to restricting Black employment and benefits, a number 
of laws, policies, and legally sanctioned agreements created and 
enforced residential segregation. In Buchanan v. Warley,82 in 1917, a 
Black home buyer sued a White seller for refusing to complete the sale 
of his house in accordance with a Louisville ordinance prohibiting the 
sale of a home to a Black owner on a majority White block.83 The Court 
ruled the ordinance unconstitutional under both the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.84 However, because there 
must be state action, such as the Louisville ordinance, for a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation, and the Civil Rights Act applies primarily to 
public accommodations, the decision did not cover private agreements.85  
 
 78. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, Pub. L. 74-271, §	210(b)(1)–(2), 49 Stat. 620, 625 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	410(a)(3)(A)–(B) (2012)). See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR 
ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 259–60 (2013); Laura Ann Foster, 
Social Security and African American Families: Unmasking Race and Gender Discrimination, 
12 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 55, 60 (2001). But see Larry DeWitt, The Decision to Exclude 
Agricultural and Domestic Workers from the 1935 Social Security Act, 70 SOC. SECURITY 
BULL., no. 4, 2010, at 49, 49; Robert C. Lieberman, Race, Institutions, and the Administration 
of Social Policy, 19 SOC. SCI. HIST. 511, 514 (1995). 
 79. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, §	2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §	152(3) (2012)); KATZNELSON, supra note 78, at 257–58; Juan F. 
Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the Agricultural and Domestic 
Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 126 (2011); 
Larry Adelman, A Long History of Racial Preferences—For Whites, PBS, http://www.pbs.org
/race/000_About/002_04-background-03-02.htm [https://perma.cc/EV9V-FYTC]. 
 80. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§	151–169 (2012)). See PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: 
AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY 1–2 (2008); Perea, supra note 79, at 125–26. 
 81. Adelman, supra note 79. 
 82. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
 83. Id. at 70. 
 84. Id. at 82. 
 85. See 1920s–1948: Racially Restrictive Covenants, FAIR HOUSING CTR. GREATER BOS., 
http://www.bostonfairhousing.org/timeline/1920s1948-Restrictive-Covenants.html [https://perma.cc
/W3XH-FGNC]. 
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The Court revisited the issue several years later, in 1926, in 
Corrigan v. Buckley.86 Here, the Court held that racially restrictive 
covenants were agreements between private citizens that fell outside the 
reach of the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.87 The 
Court also affirmed that the Civil Rights Act contained no restrictions 
on the decisions of private property owners.88 Eventually, in 1948, in 
Shelley v. Kraemer,89 the Court decided that, although racially restrictive 
covenants created by private parties evaded review, judicial enforcement 
of them constituted state action.90 Thereafter, any attempts to enforce a 
covenant through the courts resulted in invalidation. Twenty years later, 
in 1968, the Fair Housing Act prohibited them altogether.91 
The covenant under review in Shelley is illustrative. It read: 
no part of the affected property shall be “occupied by any person 
not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the 
use of said property	.	.	.	against the occupancy as owners or tenants 
of any portion of said property for resident or other purposes by 
people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.”92 
Other covenants provided exceptions for domestic servants residing in 
the home.93 Typically, a covenant becomes part of the deed passed on to 
new owners, who risk forfeiture if they violate its terms.94 Further, 
covenants generally run with the land, making them enforceable against 
future buyers.95 Individuals, in addition to real estate and neighborhood 
boards, took responsibility for enforcing racially restrictive covenants, a 
mission that often led to racial violence perpetrated to drive away Black 
 
 86. 271 U.S. 323 (1926). 
 87. Id. at 329–31.  
 88. Id.  
 89. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  
 90. Id. at 19–20.  
 91. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§	3601–3619 (2012)). 
 92. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 9–10 (omission in original) (quoting Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 
S.W.2d 679, 681 (Mo. 1946)). 
 93. TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD, CONN., LAND RECORDS: DRYAD’S GROVE 342 (1941), 
http://magic.lib.uconn.edu/magic_2/vector/37840/155/primary_source/hdming_37840_155_1941
_land_records_west_hartford_trinity_dryads_grove.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TVU-TMQ2] (“No 
persons of any race other than the white race shall use or occupancy any building or lot, 
except that this covenant shall not prevent occupancy by domestic servants of a different race 
domiciled with an owner or tenant.”).  
 94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) §	1.3 (AM. LAW. INST. 2000); see 
also 1920s–1948: Racially Restrictive Covenants, supra note 85. 
 95. Id. 
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home buyers.96 By 1940, racially restrictive covenants covered eighty 
percent of the property owned in Chicago and Los Angeles.97 
Unfortunately, the creation of the Federal Housing Administration 
(“FHA”) in 1934 did little to alleviate the effects of private 
discrimination on segregation.98 Instead, the agency increased 
segregation through policies such as redlining, which rendered residents 
of certain areas ineligible for federal housing loans.99 Redlining began 
with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s request to the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation in 1935 “to create ‘residential security maps’ 
for 239 cities[.]”100 These maps evaluated the “trend of desirability” for 
mortgage lending101 and “indicate[d] the level of security for real estate 
investments in each surveyed city.”102 The maps featured color-coded 
grades, ranging from (A), the highest, to (D), the lowest, based on an 
evaluation of housing conditions and residents’ “social status.”103 
Neighborhoods with non-White, immigrant, and poor residents received 
 
 96. JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE 
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING 57 (2013); see also ISABEL 
WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT 
MIGRATION 271–74 (2010); Coates, supra note 36, at 64 (featuring the story of Clyde Ross, 
one of the founders of the Contract Buyers League, designed to fight back against housing 
discrimination in Chicago).  
 97. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NO. 42, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 4 (1973), 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr11042.pdf [https://perma.cc/79TU-
J82P] (“By 1940, according to a magazine article, 80 percent of both Chicago and Los Angeles 
carried restrictive convenants [sic] barring black families.”); 1920s–1948: Racially Restrictive 
Covenants, supra note 85. 
 98. See KATZNELSON, supra note 78, at 163; Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: 
Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 OR. L. REV. 453, 476 (2010); George Steven 
Swan, The Law and Economics of Affirmative Action in Housing: The Diversity Impulse, 15 
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 133, 184 (2006); Alexis C. Madrigal, The Racist Housing Policy That 
Made Your Neighborhood, ATLANTIC (May 22, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business
/archive/2014/05/the-racist-housing-policy-that-made-your-neighborhood/371439/ [https://perma
.cc/H4PM-BQVE]. 
 99. Strand, supra note 98, at 490; Swan, supra note 98, at 160. 
 100. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at 
the Community Affairs Research Conference: The Community Reinvestment Act: Its 
Evolution and New Challenges (Mar. 30, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/speech/bernanke20070330a.htm [https://perma.cc/DH2X-XTW7]. See generally HOME 
OWNERS’ LOAN CORP., RESIDENTIAL SECURITY “REDLINING” MAP AND AREA 
DESCRIPTIONS: HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT (1937), http://magic.lib.uconn.edu/magic_2/vector
/37840/primary_source/hdimg_37840_064_1937_holc_national_archives_trinity.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7V9V-YL2S] (demonstrating that race and social status were taken into account 
when redlining neigborhoods in Hartford, Connecticut). 
 101. HOME OWNERS’ LOAN CORP., supra note 100, at §	1; Amy E. Hillier, Redlining and 
the Homeowners’ Loan Corporation, 29 J. URB. HIST. 394, 400 (2003); Madrigal, supra note 
98. 
 102. Bernanke, supra note 100. 
 103. HOME OWNERS’ LOAN CORP., supra note 100, §	1. 
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the lowest grades.104 The red shading of these Type D areas thus led to 
the creation of the term “redlining” to describe racial discrimination in 
mortgage and credit lending.105 
Redlining allowed the FHA, a crucial part of Roosevelt’s New 
Deal,106 to make home ownership possible for millions of White 
Americans, while excluding members of Black and integrated 
communities from access to this crucial path to financial stability and 
wealth accumulation, regardless of their creditworthiness.107 Of the $120 
billion in home loans administered by the FHA between 1934 and 1962, 
98% of them went to Whites.108 Similarly, between 1946 and 1960, less 
than 100 of the 350,000 new homes in Northern California financed by 
the FHA went to Black families.109 
Additionally, the FHA’s policies led White middle class inhabitants 
to leave integrated urban areas for the suburbs, thereby accelerating 
urban decay.110 Under FHA rules, many White home owners found it 
easier to obtain a loan for a new home than for repairs and abandoned 
their residences accordingly.111 FHA publications further discouraged 
integrated living by problematizing neighborhoods containing 
“inharmonious racial or nationality groups” as ones that disseminate 
“smoke, odors, and fog.”112 An extreme response to FHA policies 
encouraging White flight sprang up in Detroit, where attempts to 
circumvent these negative characterizations and obtain an FHA loan to 
 
 104. See id.; Bernanke, supra note 100. 
 105. Bernanke, supra note 100; see also HOME OWNERS’ LOAN CORP., supra note 100, at 
§	1; Analiese Fernandes, A Brief History of Racism in Redlining, IMPACT (Oct. 22, 2016), 
http://upennimpact.org/brief-history-racism-redlining/ [https://perma.cc/KYR2-M2QD]. 
 106. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. 84-345, 48 Stat. 847 (creating the FHA).  
 107. Brian Gilmore, Home Is Where the Hatred Is: A Proposal for a Federal Housing 
Administration Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, 
GENDER & CLASS 249, 259, 262 (2010); see also Aric Short, Post-Acquisition Harassment and 
the Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 203, 210, 223 (2006); Bernanke, supra note 
100.  
 108. GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE 
PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS 6 (rev. ed. 1998) (citing JULL QUADAGNO, THE 
COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 91–92 (1994)).  
 109. Adelman, supra note 79. 
 110. See KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
CONSERVATISM 60–61 (2005) (discussing how the FHA encouraged racial restrictions that 
segregated White and Black neighborhoods); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice 
Myth, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 967, 982 (2012). 
 111. Roslyn Corenzwit Lieb et al., Abandonment of Residential Property in an Urban 
Context, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1186, 1188–98 (1974); Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of 
Segregation: Toward a New Historical and Legal Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617, 625 (1999). 
 112. JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN 
RACISM 129 (2006). 
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integrate a sparsely populated Black area led to the construction of a 
concrete wall between neighboring White and Black communities.113 
In conjunction with the FHA, the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act 
of 1944 (“GI Bill”) failed to raise the Black community’s economic 
status because it provided for fewer benefits to Black veterans than 
White veterans.114 For example, under the GI Bill’s directive to offer 
special support for veterans seeking to purchase new homes, less than 
3% of FHA or Veterans Affairs loans went to non-White veterans.115 
This extreme disparity reflected both the FHA’s racist policies and the 
biases of individual loan officers and bankers.116 Other parts of the GI 
Bill, which provided veterans opportunities for job skills training and 
education, similarly bypassed Blacks because of the socially acceptable 
racist policies and attitudes of White officials, business people, 
administrators, and institutions.117  
Employment programs funneled Blacks into low-paying jobs, and 
educational scholarships applied only to small Black colleges with few 
resources.118 Illustratively, in October 1946, of the 6,500 workers 
awarded jobs through the GI Bill, Whites received 86% of the skilled 
and semi-skilled positions while Blacks, in stark contrast, garnered 92% 
of the unskilled positions.119 Additionally, of the 9,000 students enrolled 
at the University of Pennsylvania, which had one of the most racially 
inclusive policies of Ivy League schools at the time,120 only forty-six were 
 
 113. See DORCETA E. TAYLOR, TOXIC COMMUNITIES: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, 
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION, AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 241 (2014). This divide is otherwise 
“known as the Birwood Wall.” Id. 
 114. See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (G.I. Bill), Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 
284 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.); KATZNELSON, supra note 44, at 
114–15, 128; see also Mark Boulton, How the G.I. Bill Failed African-American Vietnam War 
Veterans, 58 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 57, 58–59 (2007); Juan F. Perea, Doctrines of 
Delusion: How the History of the G.I. Bill and Other Inconvenient Truths Undermine the 
Supreme Court’s Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 583, 585 (2014); Sarah 
Turner & John Bound, Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: The Effects of the G.I. Bill 
and World War II on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans, 63 J. ECON. HIST. 145, 
145 (2003) (describing how Black veterans were discriminated against, as compared to their 
fellow White soldiers, for educational opportunities following World War II). 
 115. Cyd McKenna, The Homeownership Gap: How the Post-World War II GI Bill 
Shaped Modern Day Homeownership Patterns for Black and White Americans 59 (May 22, 
2008) (unpublished Master in City Planning thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), https://
dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/44333/276173994-MIT.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MCQ-J3QK]. 
 116. GLENN C. ALTSCHULER & STUART M. BLUMIN, THE GI BILL: THE NEW DEAL FOR 
VETERANS 198–99 (2009). 
 117. See id. at 128–29. 
 118. See Perea, supra note 114, at 494–95. 
 119. KATZNELSON, supra note 44, at 138. 
 120. Id. at 130. 
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Black.121 Correspondingly, during this period, the overwhelming number 
of enrollments in historically Black colleges and universities led those 
institutions to unprecedented growth, with enrollment numbers 
increasing from 29,000 in 1940 to 73,000 in 1947.122 
Other laws, related to taxes123 and inheritance,124 similarly drove and 
maintained a wedge between Blacks’ and Whites’ abilities to further 
their economic status. Simultaneously, federal food policy contributed to 
racial health disparities: facially neutral policies that disproportionately 
benefited Whites took thousands of Blacks out of the workforce every 
year due to illnesses and premature deaths.125 Finally, the criminal justice 
system ensnared hundreds of thousands of Black men and women, 
severely limiting their employment opportunities even upon release.126 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 120. 
 123. See ANDRE L. SMITH, TAX LAW AND RACIAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE: BLACK TAX 67 
(2015) (showing how tax laws have disadvantaged Black people). Professor Andre Smith 
traces the complicated history of racism and taxation, describing the effect of slavery as a 
100% tax on Black labor, id. at 76; oppressive taxation of free Blacks before the Civil War to 
discourage slave revolts and competition with Whites, which lead to re-enslavement through 
incarceration for failure to pay, id. at 85–90; poll tax requirements for voting, id. at 151–54; 
preferential treatment for capital gains income, id. at 204; home mortgage deductions, id. at 
167; and the redistributive potential of taxation. Id. at 181. 
 124. See Strand, supra note 98, at 464–68 (describing how inheritance law contributes to 
racial wealth inequality and proposing changes to testacy and intestacy laws to decrease the 
advantages bestowed on Whites and the disadvantages imposed on Blacks by these laws). 
 125. See Andrea Freeman, Behavioral Economics and Food Policy: The Limits and Politics 
of Nudging, in NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 124, 133–
34 (I. Glen Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch & Christopher T. Robertson eds., 2016); Andrea 
Freeman, Fast Food: Oppression Through Poor Nutrition, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2221, 2227–28, 
2242–45 (2007) (describing how cooperation between the fast food industry and the 
government leads to poor access to healthy food in many low-income communities of color, 
whose members suffer disproportionately from deaths and diseases related to poor nutrition); 
Andrea Freeman, “First Food” Justice: Racial Disparities in Infant Feeding as Food 
Oppression, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3053, 3063–66 (2015) (exploring how law and policy that 
supports the formula industry leads to racial disparities in breastfeeding, linked to higher 
infant mortality rates in Black children and other health disparities); Andrea Freeman, The 
Unbearable Whiteness of Milk: Food Oppression and the USDA, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1251, 
1252–54 (2013) (exploring how the USDA’s attempts to dispose of the dairy surplus through 
partnerships with fast food companies and distribution through its nutrition programs 
disproportionately harm communities of color); Andrea Freeman, Transparency for Food 
Consumers: Nutrition Labeling and Food Oppression, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 316–21 (2015) 
(examining how the USDA’s focus on improving health by altering consumer behavior 
through nutrition labeling and consumer education perpetuates racial health disparities by 
neglecting the absence of choice many consumers of color have regarding food selection); see 
also David R. Williams & Pamela Braboy Jackson, Social Sources of Racial Disparities in 
Health, 24 HEALTH AFF. 325, 327–30 (2005). 
 126. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 26–58 (2010) (explaining how the criminal justice system creates 
and perpetuates a racial hierarchy in the United States). See generally ANGELA Y. DAVIS, 
ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003) (suggesting that the criminal justice system can achieve 
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In turn, these limitations on Black prosperity created greater 
opportunities for Whites to flourish. As Oliver and Shapiro explain in 
their seminal work, Black Wealth/White Wealth: 
When black workers were paid less than white workers, white 
workers gained a benefit; when black businesses were confined to 
the segregated black market, white businesses received the benefit 
of diminished competition; when FHA policies denied loans to 
blacks, whites were the beneficiaries of the spectacular growth of 
good housing and housing equity in the suburbs.	The cumulative 
effect of such a process has been to sediment blacks at the bottom 
of the social hierarchy and to artificially raise the relative position 
of some whites in society.127 
One significant result of the systemic, institutionalized povertization 
of the Black community is a great need for credit. Without a safety net 
of wealth on which to fall back, even many middle-class Black families 
live paycheck-to-paycheck, existing only one unforeseen expense—such 
as a medical emergency or a broken car—away from financial crisis.128  
In some ways, this type of urgent need for credit is unique to the 
United States because the U.S. government provides far less of a social 
safety net to its citizens and residents than most other developed 
countries.129 For example, both Canada and England provide free health 
care to their citizens, so that individuals in those countries can maintain 
a minimum quality of life and need not fear that medical problems will 
lead to financial crisis, or that an inability to pay will cause them to 
forego necessary treatment.130 In contrast, in the United States’ 
 
justice with less incarceration); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING 
WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007) (examining the impact of crime policies 
on the rise of mass incarceration in the United States); BETH E. RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: 
BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S PRISON NATION (2012) (offering a way to 
broaden the collective understanding of violence against women of color and to challenge the 
evolution of anti-violence efforts in the United States); GLOBAL LOCKDOWN: RACE, 
GENDER, AND THE PRISON-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (Julia Sudbury ed., 2005) (attempting to 
shed new light on incarcerated women to shift the discourse on women’s imprisonment); 
PRISON NATION: THE WAREHOUSING OF AMERICA’S POOR (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright 
eds., 2003) (suggesting the prison system is akin to a social experiment gone wrong through a 
collection of essays). 
 127. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 44, at 53. 
 128. See Freeman, supra note 37, at 181. 
 129. See Karen Jusko, Safety Net, PATHWAYS, no. 1, 2016, at 25, 30. 
 130. Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6; About the National Health Service (NHS), 
NHS CHOICES (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/about/Pages/overview
.aspx [https://perma.cc/U3L4-BHC6]; see also Steve Gold, Four Healthcare Systems Divided 
by the English Language, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2011, 2:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com
/healthcare-network/2011/jun/07/healthcare-systems-australia-medicare-canada-saskatchewan 
[https://perma.cc/7WSF-XPSH]. 
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capitalist-based economy, even the Affordable Care Act’s131 expansion 
of health insurance, as opposed to government provision of health care, 
was controversial, and one of the first targets in the subsequent 
administration’s campaign to dismantle social- and welfare-minded laws 
and policies.132 
The absence of a social safety net in the United States makes credit 
an indispensable survival tool for both the lower and middle classes, a 
group often referred to as “the 99%,”133 because they are vulnerable to 
shocks such as illness, job loss, and economic depression or inflation.134 
Further, in spite of the many problems documented here, credit cards 
are still usually preferable to fringe lending options, such as check 
cashing, payday loans, and pawn shops.135 Additionally, residential and 
social segregation make it less likely that Black individuals in financial 
straits will have relatives or friends from whom they can borrow.136  
The legacy of exploitation of Blacks’ legally created and sanctioned 
economic disadvantage, originating in slavery, continues with the 
predatory and discriminatory practices of credit card corporations today. 
The following Section zeroes in on the history and current landscape of 
racial disparities in credit card lending. 
B. Racial Disparities and Discrimination in Credit Card Use 
Racial disparities in the treatment of credit card holders emerged as 
the industry’s business model evolved. Initially, credit card companies 
sought out wealthy consumers who would pay off their bills at the end of 
 
 131. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §	18001 note (2015)).  
 132. Vann R. Newkirk II, The Trump Administration’s First Blow to Obamacare, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/the-trump-
administrations-first-blow-to-obamacare/514103/ [https://perma.cc/4ZMC-JZKN]. 
 133. See OXFAM, BRIEFING PAPER: AN ECONOMY FOR THE 99%, at 2 (2017), https://
www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-economy-for-99-percent-160117-en
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZNA-KY2N]; Ezra Klein, Who Are the 99 Percent?, WASH. POST (Oct. 
4, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/who-are-the-99-percent/2011/08
/25/gIQAt87jKL_blog.html?utm_term=.aff31b024bf8 [https://perma.cc/6MAB-6UBW].  
 134. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE ROLE OF EMERGENCY SAVINGS IN FAMILY 
FINANCIAL SECURITY: HOW DO FAMILIES COPE WITH FINANCIAL SHOCKS? 1–3 (2015), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/10/emergency-savings-report-1_artfinal.pdf?la
=en [https://perma.cc/NB69-GA6C]. 
 135. See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory 
Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
1110, 1123–28 (2008).  
 136. Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, The Burden of Debt on Black America, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/debt-black-families
/409756/ [https://perma.cc/5BQY-Z4AC]. 
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each month.137 The companies eventually learned, however, that, 
counterintuitively, they could earn greater profits for their shareholders 
by targeting high-risk consumers who could not, in fact, pay their bills 
off in full, but would put some money toward them each month.138 These 
“revolvers” are often “subsistence users”—consumers who rely on credit 
cards to pay, at least in part, for life’s necessities.139 They are primarily 
the working poor and many of them are people of color who face 
significant obstacles to financial prosperity that arise from systemic and 
historical structural inequality.140 
Credit card companies compound the financial difficulties of these 
subsistence users through unreasonable but unavoidable fees and high 
and fluctuating interest rates.141 Further, drawing from the insights of 
behavioral economics, credit card companies attract these customers 
with appealingly low “teaser rates” (such as “0% introductory APR”) 
that skyrocket several months down the line.142 Credit card companies 
also make unsolicited mass mailings of “pre-approved” card offers to 
households living in economically depressed neighborhoods, extending 
 
 137. For a comprehensive explanation of the evolution and present state of the credit card 
industry’s business model, as well as a discussion of structural racism in the credit card 
industry, see generally Freeman, supra note 37. 
 138. See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF 
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 81–82 (2006); Freeman, supra note 37, 161–62. 
 139. See TRAUB & REUTSCHLIN, supra note 32, at 9–10. Revolvers are credit card users 
who carry a balance from month to month. Transactor, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www
.investopedia.com/terms/t/transactor.asp [https://perma.cc/2QUR-6LCX]. Subsistence users 
do this out of necessity. Mary Beth Matthews, The Credit CARD Act of 2009–Four Years 
Later, 2013 ARK. L. NOTES 1488, ¶	52; Freeman, supra note 37, at 153 (“A subsistence user is 
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bill the next, or to purchase essential items such as gas, groceries, or diapers. This type of user 
contrasts with the ‘lifestyle user,’ who uses credit cards to enhance her lifestyle, either 
minimally or considerably.”). Lifestyle users generally enjoy the perks of credit card use, such 
as cash back and airline miles, for which subsistence users foot the bill. Adam J. Levitin, The 
Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs 
of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 317 (2005). 
 140. See, e.g., Paul Burstein & Mark Evan Edwards, The Impact of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation on Racial Disparity in Earnings: Evidence and Unresolved Issues, 28 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 79, 79–80 (1994); Freeman. supra note 37, at 179–88; Devah Pager & Hana 
Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, 
Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 182 (2008); Lathonia Denise Stewart 
& Richard Perlow, Applicant Race, Job Status, and Racial Attitude as Predictors of 
Employment Discrimination, 16 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 259, 260–61 (2001); Jonathan C. Zeigert 
& Paul J. Hanges, Employment Discrimination: The Role of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and 
a Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 553, 553 (2005); see also supra Part I.A.  
 141. See Freeman, supra note 37, at 166–68; Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1373, 1392–93 (2004). Although amendments to the CARD Act eliminated some of 
the more egregious fees, late fees and rising interest rates continue to be a problem. TRAUB & 
REUTSCHLIN, supra note 32, at 24. 
 142. Freeman, supra note 37, at 166–68; Oren Bar-Gill, supra note 141, at 1392–93.  
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exploitative credit terms to residents of predominately Black or Latino 
neighborhoods, while enticing residents of affluent, White 
neighborhoods with offers of “pre-approved” cards with perks such as 
cash back, air miles, and low interest rates.143 In lower-income 
neighborhoods, it is likely that residents sometimes accept the terms of 
these cards without shopping for better ones based on a belief that they 
are ineligible for better, or any, credit.144 
It is difficult, however, to identify the precise disparities in the 
treatment of Black and White credit card consumers because regulations 
do not require companies to disclose the details of their transactions, 
such as which cards they offer and sell to which consumers on which 
terms.145 Keeping this information secret allows the companies to engage 
in discrimination that is very hard, if not impossible, for potential or 
actual plaintiffs to prove.146 In the similar context of discriminatory 
practices in the mortgage industry, Congress recognized and addressed 
this problem in the 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”).147  
HMDA initially required mortgage lenders in urban areas to 
collect, report, and make available to the public data about their lending 
practices.148 Amendments to the Act in 1989 expanded the required data 
collection to include the race, gender, and income of home loan 
applicants and borrowers.149 Further amendments in 2002 required 
disclosure of price data.150 Unfortunately, however, continuing 
documentation of racial discrimination in mortgage lending illustrates 
that HMDA’s collection and disclosure requirements do not eliminate 
 
 143. See Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference 
Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 475 (2008); Freeman, supra note 37, at 
166–68. 
 144. See Freeman, supra note 37, at 167. 
 145. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§	1601–1637 (2012)). 
 146. See, e.g., Osborne v. Bank of America, Nat’l Ass’n, 234 F. Supp. 2d 804, 812 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2012) (allowing the use of disparate impact analysis to prove lending discrimination). 
The standard of proof required to prevail on an ECOA discrimination claim is currently 
contested and unresolved by the Supreme Court. See Winnie Taylor, Proving Racial 
Discrimination and Monitoring Fair Lending Compliance: The Missing Data Problem in 
Nonmortgage Credit, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 199, 200 & n.4 (2011–2012).  
 147. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, §	302(a)–(b), 89 Stat. 
1125, 1125 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §	2801(a)–(b) (2012)); 12 U.S.C. §	2801(b) (2012). As 
discussed directly above, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) does not effectively 
prevent discrimination, but it does put more pressure on lending institutions to comply with 
anti-discrimination laws and enable discovery of non-compliance. 
 148. §	304, 89 Stat. at 1125–26.  
 149. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, §	1211(a)(3)–(4), 103 Stat. 183, 524 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §	2803(b)(4) (2012)).  
 150. History of HMDA, FFIEC, https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/history2.htm [https://perma.cc
/6KG5-4AMK].  
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discriminatory practices.151 Nonetheless, they represent a crucial first 
step to reform that is heretofore absent in the consumer credit context. 
In contrast, lack of transparency on the part of the credit card companies 
enables discrimination by preventing its identification. It also helps to 
ward off the potential for reputational harm or consumer response that 
media attention to the problem might create. 
However, despite the lack of access to definitive statistics on credit 
card industry practices, two studies analyzed available data to conclude 
that race, isolated from socio-economic status, has a significant effect on 
a user’s ability to obtain a credit card and on which terms they receive. 
Specifically, in 2010, researcher Chi-Jack Lin demonstrated that race 
affects the likelihood of obtaining a credit card, the number of cards 
owned, the average credit line per card, the conditions and fees attached 
to a card, and the factors necessary to establish creditworthiness.152 He 
found that this type of discrimination occurs based on the names listed 
on an application, which can often suggest racial identity,153 or the 
physical appearance of credit card applicants who walk into banks to 
request a card in person.154  
Additionally, a 2011 study published in the Review of Economics 
and Statistics, authored by Ethan Cohen-Cole and titled Credit Card 
Redlining, reports that living in a Black neighborhood significantly 
affects a credit card applicant’s ability to get a card and the terms of that 
card.155 The report documents that credit card applicants from White 
neighborhoods with risk profiles and credit histories identical to their 
 
 151. See Richard D. Marsico, Looking Back and Looking Ahead as the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act Turns Thirty-Five: The Role of Public Disclosure of Lending Data in a Time of 
Financial Crisis, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 205, 206 (2009) (positing that the 2002 
amendments, like the 1989 amendments, did not require lenders to disclose the credit score of 
borrowers and thus “hamper[ed] efforts to determine whether higher rates of rejections of 
loan applications from minority borrowers than whites were due to relatively weaker 
creditworthiness or race”); cf. Mark Fogarty, HMDA Data Offers Clues on Discrimination 
Against Gays, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (June 4, 2014, 4:46 PM), https://web.archive.org/web
/20160323070839/http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/blogs/hearing/hmda-data-offers-clues-
on-discrimination-against-gays-1041913-1.html [https://perma.cc/4XAS-TPNW] (noting that 
discrimination against same-sex couples in the housing and mortgage lending industries still 
existed in 2012 despite HMDA amendments).  
 152. Chi-Jack Lin, Racial Discrimination in the Consumer Credit Market 45 (2010) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file
?accession=osu1276708518&disposition=inline [https://perma.cc/CM3X-YCN8]. 
 153. See Sweeney, supra note 11, at 16. 
 154. Id. at 32–33. 
 155. Ethan Cohen-Cole, Credit Card Redlining, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 700, 712 (2011). 
Cohen-Cole’s study has been critiqued for its methodology. See Kenneth P. Brevoort, Credit 
Card Redlining Revisited, REV. OF ECON. & STAT., May 2011, at 714. 
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counterparts in Black neighborhoods receive approximately $7,000 more 
in available credit.156  
Similarly, Simon Firestone conducted a study, published in 2014, 
concluding that Blacks are less than half as likely as other groups to 
possess credit cards due to racial differences in credit card marketing.157 
Also, to counter the common argument that differences in credit terms 
and amounts simply reflect variances in credit and spending habits, a 
2001 study by Sheila Ards and Samuel Myers refutes the myths that 
Blacks disproportionately overspend, fail to save, and are not 
creditworthy.158 The study reveals that there is no statistically significant 
difference in bad credit rates between Blacks and Whites in the richest 
and poorest households.159 In middle class Black and White households, 
where the authors note differences in bad credit ratings, they argue that 
the disparities arise from discriminatory treatment in the credit market, 
not variation in personal habits.160 
Contrary to the type of racism described as “post-racial,”161 which 
consists of offensive epithets and clearly stated ill intentions, most racial 
discrimination by the credit card industry is not the product of willful 
and malicious bias. Instead, this discrimination generally reflects rational 
economic decisions to exploit existing systemic and structural social 
inequalities for profit.162 Racial stereotypes, pervasive in the media and 
 
 156. Cohen-Cole, supra note 155, at 708. 
 157. Simon Firestone, Race Ethnicity and Credit Card Monitoring, J. OF MONEY, CREDIT 
& BANKING, Sept. 2014, at 1206. See also Song Han, Benjamin J. Keys & Geng Li, Unsecured 
Credit Supply over the Credit Cycle: Evidence from Credit Card Mailings (manuscript at 26 & 
n.29), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1848206 [https://perma.cc/9WGV-
GFAH (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 158. See Sheila D. Ards & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Color of Money: Bad Credit, Wealth, 
and Race, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 223, 238 (2001). 
 159. Id. at 236. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See generally DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING 
RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013) (discussing post-racial bias in the workplace); Mario 
L. Barnes, Reflection on a Dream World: Race, Post-Race and the Question of Making It Over, 
11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 6 (2009) (analyzing theories of a “post-racial” world); 
Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009) (describing definitions in post-
racialism); Ian F. Haney-López, Essay, Post-Racial Racialism: Racial Stratification and Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2010) (arguing for a 
“renewed focus on racism, in particular on ‘post-racial racism’	”); Cheryl Harris, Professor, 
UCLA Sch. of Law, Address at the University of Virginia School of Law: Race Declassified: 
Post-Racial Divisions (Feb. 26, 2015). 
 162. See Benjamin Howell, Note, Exploiting Race and Space: Concentrated Subprime 
Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 101, 108–09 (2006) (endorsing this 
theory in the context of redlining). When banks charge higher interest rates and fees, they 
collect more money from consumers, particularly when the higher rates and fees do not reflect 
credit risk. Transactor, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/creditrisk
.asp [https://perma.cc/U3QW-9UMW]. For an explanation of how profit motivates 
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popular culture, provide support for and acceptance of this behavior. 
Further, even in cases of discrimination based on a face-to-face 
encounter or a person’s name, bias may be unconscious or implicit, not 
intentional.163 This distinction, however, is not important because the 
root of the problem and its solution are structural, not dependent on 
individuals’ states of mind or personal beliefs. 
Technological advancements in creditworthiness determinations 
further open the door to discrimination that is hard to identify or 
redress. For example, some credit card companies rely on 
personalization technology, or “data mining,” to customize their 
Internet offers.164 As described above, Capital One Financial 
Corporation employs micro-segmentation, the practice of analyzing a 
multiplicity of information gathered from data on a consumer’s 
computer, to determine which cards to show first-time visitors to its 
website.165 Other credit card companies, such as Citibank, previously 
relied on “push” segmentation to categorize consumers, utilizing more 
traditional markers, such as income, to determine card eligibility.166 
Now, Citibank depends primarily on FICO scoring.167 However, FICO 
scores contain racial disparities that may reflect racist bias programmed 
 
discrimination in the mortgage industry, see Jordan Weissman, Countrywide’s Racist Lending 
Practices Were Fueled by Greed, ATLANTIC (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com
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BIG SHORT (Plan B Entertainment Inc. 2015). 
 163. See Mahzarin R. Banaji, R. Bhaskar & Michael Brownstein, When Bias Is Implicit, 
How Might We Think About Repairing Harm?, 6 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 183, 183 
(2015); Erik J. Girvan, On Using the Psychological Science of Implicit Bias to Advance Anti-
Discrimination Law, 26 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 1, 26 (2015); see also IMPLICIT RACIAL 
BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 9–24 (Justin Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012). 
 164. See ANINDYA GHOSE ET AL., DYNAMIC PRICING: A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE FOR 
ELECTRONIC RETAILERS 305–06, http://people.stern.nyu.edu/aghose/Dynamic_Pricing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TLW5-5P6S]; Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web’s Cutting Edge, 
Anonymity in Name Only, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424052748703294904575385532109190198; Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Jeremy 
Singer-Vine & Ashkan Soltani, Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles
/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534. 
 165. Sharon McDonnell, Microsegmentation, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 29, 2001, 12:00 
AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2590756/it-management/microsegmentation
.html [https://perma.cc/3Y2B-VEC9]. See supra text accompanying notes 2–10. 
 166. McDonnell, supra note 165. 
 167. See William Charles, What Credit Bureau Does Citibank Pull?, DR. CREDIT (Sept. 8, 
2016), http://www.doctorofcredit.com/credit-bureau-citibank-pull/ [https://perma.cc/B9XB-
QTM3] (reporting that Citibank will mostly rely on Experian and Equifax credit reports); Be 
Aware—Don’t Confuse Your FICO Score with “Educational” Scores, MYFICO, http://www
.myfico.com/crediteducation/questions/why-three-scores.aspx [https://perma.cc/TFW3-TSSW] 
(noting that Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion generate FICO scores).  
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into the algorithms that power the data collection that produces a 
score.168  
Purchasing data from companies such as FICO to determine credit 
denials and terms affords credit card companies the opportunity to 
engage in indirect racial discrimination. For example, the companies 
often assess creditworthiness based on factors that stand in for race.169 
Most significantly, because most of the United States is residentially 
segregated, neighborhood can serve as a proxy for race.170 Similarly, 
affinities, such as professional associations and sports teams, can point to 
income level or geographic location, indirectly providing insight into the 
consumer’s race.171 Additionally, although the big data that 
personalization technology can provide to corporations might appear to 
be race-neutral, using it to classify consumers can open the door to racial 
stereotyping in the marketplace. 
Data analyst and writer Cecilia Rabess cautions, “When we 
translate cultural clichés and stereotypes into empirically verifiable 
datasets we introduce subjectivity into a discipline that strives for 
objectivity. When we imbue our big data insights with our race-based 
biases we project our prejudices onto subsequent observations.”172 The 
potential for a collision between racism and data collection therefore 
exists in credit card companies’ use of information gathered on social 
media sites, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, to determine 
 
 168. See Sarah Ludwig, Credit Scores in America Perpetuate Racial Injustice. Here’s How, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2015, 10:14 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct
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Deidre Swesnik, Discriminatory Effects of Credit Scoring on Communities of Color, 46 
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 169. For a comprehensive description of how racism becomes coded in “neutral” language 
and policy, see generally IAN HANEY-LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED 
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(2014). 
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integrated system of oppression, see Barbara Reskin, The Race Discrimination System, 38 
ANN. REV. SOC. 17, 20–24 (2012); see also ROITHMAYR, supra note 44, at 99–100. 
 171. See, e.g., 2013 Sports Fan Demographics, OPENDORSE, http://opendorse.com/blog
/2013-sports-fan-demographics/ [https://perma.cc/8FJ3-KXC2]; Which Sports have the 
Whitest/Oldest/Richest Fans?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business
/archive/2014/02/which-sports-have-the-whitest-richest-oldest-fans/283626/ [https://perma.cc
/D5WK-3FK7]. 
 172. Cecilia Esther Rabess, Can Big Data Be Racist?, BOLD ITALIC (May 31, 2014), http://
www.thebolditalic.com/articles/4502-can-big-data-be-racist [https://perma.cc/4WL3-2ESV]. 
See The Good Wife: Discovery (CBS Television Studios Nov. 29, 2015) (examining the legal 
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creditworthiness.173 Also, credit scoring sites commonly provide credit 
card companies with lists of applicants’ and customers’ Facebook friends 
for purposes of solicitation and creditworthiness determinations.174 
Depending on how the companies use this information, it could 
contribute to a racial divide in credit scoring, as Black households report 
having significantly lower credit scores than White households.175 
Further, unfortunately, the already appreciable racial gap in credit 
scores between Black and White borrowers increased after the 2008 
subprime mortgage crisis.176 
On a brighter note, there has been a general trend toward greater 
protection for credit card users, and Black consumers report that some 
of the provisions of the 2009 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility 
and Disclosure Act (“CARD”) improved their borrowing experiences.177 
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that late student loan payments or errors on their credit report contributed to their poor 
credit scores. White households were more likely to report that late mortgage payments and 
the use of nearly all existing lines of credit contributed to their poor credit scores.”). See Lea 
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1695, 1730–31 (2012). 
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For example, the CARD Act requires credit card companies to include 
clear statements on credit card bills describing how long it will take to 
pay off the balance if the customer pays only the minimum amount.178 In 
one study, 37% of Black households reported that they pay more toward 
their monthly balances due to receiving this information, thereby 
shortening the specter of their debt.179 The CARD Act also reduces the 
fees that companies can charge for exceeding credit limits and making 
late payments.180 Thirty-two percent of Black households consequently 
reported paying fewer fees for exceeding their credit limit, and twenty-
five percent stated that they paid fewer late fees.181 Further, the 
amended CARD Act restricts the conditions under which companies 
can increase interest rates,182 which has led to a self-reported 25% 
decrease in the amount of interest that the companies charge Black 
households.183 
Despite the general improvements in some credit card conditions 
wrought by the CARD Act, however, there is little evidence it has 
reduced racial disparities. In 2007, twice as many Black credit card 
holders paid interest rates above 20% than White credit card holders 
did.184 In 2013, over 40% of Black credit card users borrowed to pay for 
essential items, qualifying them as subsistence users.185 Typically, when 
financial conditions worsen, as they did in the 2008 recession, these users 
do not reduce credit card usage in response, likely because they lack 
other sources of funds, or because the alternatives, such as payday 
lending, cash checking, and pawn shops, are even more exploitative than 
credit cards.186 Nonetheless, because many Black credit card holders are 
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without friends or family who possess extra resources to lend in times of 
need, in 2010, Black consumers were more than three times more likely 
than White consumers to pay off their credit card bills by going to loan 
sharks.187 They were also more likely to declare bankruptcy due to credit 
card debt,188 and to reach a settlement agreement with a credit card 
company.189 These types of settlement agreements often harm, rather 
than help, the consumer.190 
Credit card debt amassed to finance education also creates a 
particular burden for Black graduates, who have the highest debt 
balances among college graduates.191 Over a thirty-year period beginning 
in the mid-1980s, the common perception of education as a public good 
worthy of state investment shifted to one of it as a private benefit that 
individuals should finance independently.192 During that time, as states 
contributed increasingly less to the cost of higher education, an 
unprecedented number of Blacks and Latinos enrolled in colleges and 
universities and prepared to exchange debt for a diploma.193 Due to the 
wealth gap, Black students are more likely than White students to take 
on debt to pay for college.194 Additionally, disproportionately more 
Black parents incur credit card debt to finance their children’s 
education.195 Sadly, Blacks and Latinos are also three times as likely as 
Whites to stop going to school in order to pay off their credit card 
debt.196 Further, Black students who graduate with student debt owe the 
largest amounts comparatively, with average reported debt thousands of 
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ADVERTISER (June 7, 2010), http://www.staradvertiser.com/2010/06/07/business/dont-get-
hooked/ [https://perma.cc/8E99-YYY8].  
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dollars higher than White students’ debt.197 Although policy reforms that 
would make education more financially accessible would provide the 
best solution to this type of disproportionate debt, more credit card 
companies could ease this burden by offering low and fair terms for 
credit used to pay for education. 
In addition to educational expenses, medical bills represent a 
significant cost that leads many Black families to spiral into debt. Many 
Black households do not have health insurance and, even when they do, 
the cost of deductibles, co-pays, and prescriptions often requires 
resorting to credit to pay them.198 Even worse, the cost of health care can 
be prohibitive. Almost half of middle class Black families with credit 
card debt report that they have skipped a medical test, treatment, or 
follow-up, or did not fill a prescription or see a doctor when they needed 
to, in order to avoid increasing their debt.199 Additionally, the exorbitant 
cost of emergency room visits is particularly problematic for Black 
families, whose members are more likely to suffer from chronic 
conditions, such as asthma, that require emergency care.200 In these types 
of situations, credit cards can act as lifesavers, but the subsequent debt, 
exacerbated by exploitative interest rates and fees, can quickly spiral 
and contribute to enduring or additional health problems.201 
Notwithstanding these bleak statistics, however, Black subsistence 
users often find ways to make monthly payments on their credit cards. 
Most of these payments do not reach the principal owed on the account 
or alleviate the consumer’s debt in any way.202 They do, however, 
generate profits for the credit card companies. Nonetheless, widespread 
stereotypes of these consumers as high credit risks persist. These false 
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characterizations pervade popular culture through common and widely 
accepted racial and cultural stereotypes, labeling Blacks as lazy or 
materialistic.203 Credit card companies stand to gain from these racial 
tropes because they justify steering Black customers into a subprime 
credit market on the false premise that they often default on their loans. 
The unfair and exploitative terms that characterize this subprime market 
become invisible when lenders, credit card holders, and racial advocates 
alike mistakenly believe that racial disparities in the treatment of credit 
card users arise from genuine differences in credit profiles, instead of 
deliberate corporate choices. 
C. How Racial Stereotypes Mask Structural and Institutional Racism 
Against Credit Consumers 
This analysis of racism against credit card consumers relies on the 
fundamental principles of critical race theory (“CRT”): that racism is a 
structural problem, not an individual one, and that racism is both 
pervasive and permanent.204 These principles are central to the 
rehabilitative reparations approach205 proposed in this Article, which 
shifts the focus from redress of individual harms to rebuilding 
communities. This analysis also relies on two important CRT 
methodologies. The first is the importance of narrative to shaping and 
countering collective understandings about race.206 This Section, which 
explores how the stories that popular culture tells about Black 
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Right Places: Narrative and Racial Formation Theory, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 247, 251 (2012); 
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95 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2017) 
2017] RACISM IN THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY 1107 
consumers lead to stereotypes that justify discriminatory outcomes, 
proceeds from a belief in the power of storytelling to influence hearts, 
minds, law, and policy. The second and relatively new critical race 
theory approach utilized here is empirical critical race theory (“eCRT”), 
the marriage of critical race theory with empirical methods.207 eCRT 
allows data, such as the statistics in the preceding Section, to illustrate 
that discrimination is often at work, even when the laws, policies, or 
practices that create the conditions described by the data appear to be 
facially neutral.208 
A central tenet of CRT is that race is a social construction, created 
to rationalize and perpetuate social and economic equality.209 Because 
race depends on social norms and expediencies, as opposed to 
biological, genetic, or cultural realities, race is fluid.210 New races form 
when privileged members of society seek to oppress a group that has not 
yet been clearly racially identified, such as the quasi-religious “race” of 
Muslims.211 Markers and perceptions of race are also fluid, and pliable 
through shifting allegories told in mass media and popular culture. 
Stereotypes infiltrate the collective consciousness through the news 
media, movies, music, video games, and television. Often unconsciously, 
common stereotypes become part of the way that individuals see and 
order the world, influencing their decisions and attitudes.212 The effects 
of this often “unconscious bias” can manifest themselves in both small 
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and large acts,213 from selecting a seat on a bus to fatally shooting a child 
playing with a toy gun.214 Stereotypes also affect decisions involving 
employment,215 housing,216 and credit.217 Impressed almost indelibly into 
people’s psyches, stereotypes can be so powerful that it is extremely 
difficult for individuals to separate them from their lived experiences 
and recognize them as externally created biases. Consequently, 
stereotypes often simply become unexamined truths that feel like 
common sense and guide people’s behavior.218 
Stereotypes about creditworthiness can be particularly harmful 
because of the key role that credit plays in modern life. According to a 
2013 study, 70% of American consumers possess credit cards219 and 34% 
of households do not pay them off in full at the end of the month.220 
Unfortunately, the reality of credit is that, instead of enabling people to 
make extravagant purchases, it barely covers the regular expenses of 
daily life, such as food, bills, transportation, and other necessities.221 
Further, debt prevents many individuals from advancing their lives in 
 
 213. Christopher Ingraham, Three Quarters of Whites Don’t Have Any Non-White Friends, 
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp
/2014/08/25/three-quarters-of-whites-dont-have-any-non-white-friends/ [https://perma.cc/5GMH-
TFDF]. 
 214. See Ralph Ellis & Melissa Gray, Tamir Rice Report: No Proof Police Officer Shouted 
Warning Before Shooting, CNN (June 15, 2015, 10:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/13/us
/tamir-rice-report/ [https://perma.cc/P4YV-EQCV]. 
 215. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. 
ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004); Katie Sanders, Do Job-Seekers with ‘White’ Names Get More 
Callbacks Than ‘Black’ Names?, POLITIFACT: PUNDITFACT (Mar. 15, 2015, 6:29 PM), http://
www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/mar/15/jalen-ross/black-name-resume-50-percent
-less-likely-get-respo/ [https://perma.cc/EQG5-9YG6]. 
 216. J. Rosie Tighe, How Race and Class Stereotyping Shapes Attitudes Toward Affordable 
Housing, 27 HOUSING STUD. 962, 962 (2012); Ilyce Glink, Racism Alive and Well in Housing, 
CBS (June 12, 2013, 9:03 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/racism-alive-and-well-in-
housing/ [https://perma.cc/X5BQ-QBNH]. 
 217. See Pager & Shepherd, supra note 140, at 182–85. 
 218. See Krieger, supra note 212, at 1191. 
 219. Jamie Gonzalez-Garcia, Credit Card Ownership Statistics, CREDITCARDS.COM (Oct. 
25, 2016), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/ownership-statistics.php [https://perma
.cc/7VUZ-LTRX] (citing SCOTT SCHUH & JOANNA STAVINS, FED. RES. BANK BOS., NO. 15-
4, THE 2013 SURVEY OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE: SUMMARY RESULTS (2015), http://
www.bostonfed.org/economic/rdr/2015/rdr1504.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR5H-2Q73]). 
 220. See Jamie Gonzalez & Tamara E. Holmes, Credit Card Debt Statistics, 
CREDITCARDS.COM, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-debt-statistics-1276
.php [https://perma.cc/TG6V-LD3G] (citing AM. BANKERS ASS’N, CREDIT CARD MARKET 
MONITOR 1 (2016), http://www.aba.com/Press/Documents/ABA2016Q2CreditCardMonitor
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S56-425G]). 
 221. See Martha C. White, Today’s Young Adults Will Never Pay Off Their Credit Card 
Debts, TIME (Jan. 17, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/01/17/todays-young-adults-will-
never-pay-off-their-credit-card-debts/ [https://perma.cc/7362-KJA7]. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2017) 
2017] RACISM IN THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY 1109 
productive ways. For example, credit card debt causes many students to 
reduce their course loads, in turn lengthening their education, making 
graduation a more distant goal.222 Also, many Black individuals and 
households are particularly susceptible to falling into debt spirals that 
restrict their life choices because they lack the financial safety net of 
accumulated wealth enjoyed by many Whites.223 
As demonstrated above, race and economics are inextricably 
intertwined.224 Part of this history is the story that popular culture tells 
about Black consumers.225 This story rates Blacks far below Whites in 
the hierarchy of the market economy, due to Blacks’ personal and 
culture failings.226 This oft-repeated but false tale becomes truth as it 
plays out relentlessly through a variety of media, including news, 
dramas, comedies, and music videos.227 In turn, this pervasive story 
about Blacks and money serves to justify social and economic 
inequality.228 As Marlon Riggs set out in his groundbreaking film, Ethnic 
Notions,229 since slavery, popular stereotypes have created myths about 
history, such as the happy slave and the nurturing Mammy, that justify 
oppression and subordination.230  
Even as society has evolved to allow Blacks to gain greater control 
over media depictions of themselves,231 many popular culture images 
continue to perpetuate harmful stereotypes.232 For example, modern 
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roles that have earned Black actors the elusive Oscar award233 include 
entertainer (Jennifer Hudson in Dreamgirls),234 maid (Octavia Spencer 
in The Help),235 abusive mother on welfare (Mo’nique in Precious),236 
and slave (Lupita Nyong’o in 12 Years a Slave).237 Similarly, Empire, a 
show about a family of Black rappers, criminals, and drug dealers, 
became the most popular show on network television during its first 
season.238 
One of the enduring cultural messages about Blacks is that they are 
bad with money. In 1957, Black sociologist E. Franklin Frazier published 
a scathing critique of overspending by the Black middle class titled 
Black Bourgeoisie.239 A few years later, the infamous 1965 public policy 
report by then Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
blamed Blacks’ family values, or lack thereof, for their communities’ 
poverty.240 In 2004, in a controversial speech at the NAACP’s fifty-year 
anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education celebration, Bill Cosby 
lamented that some Black parents are willing to spend $500 on sneakers 
but not $250 on Hooked on Phonics for their kids.241  
Today, rapper Lil’ Kim boasts about being a baller on a reality 
show,242 exposés reveal that the cast members of The Real Housewives of 
Atlanta are actually broke,243 and ubiquitous images show Black 
celebrities, from Oprah to Nicki Minaj, loaded down with designer 
shopping bags.244 Black television icons like “Cookie” Lyon245 and Olivia 
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Pope246 wear nothing but high-end designer clothing. And hip hop 
heroes, from EPMD (“Erick and Parrish Making Dollars”) in 1990247 to 
Jay Z in 1998248 to Kanye West in 2005,249 release hits about “gold 
diggers.” 
These stereotypes about Black consumers’ relationships to money 
and credit permeate the media and popular culture, influencing both 
creditors and borrowers. In particular, stereotypes of Blacks as 
profligate overspenders and irresponsible or deviant consumers, which 
date back to Reconstruction,250 create obstacles to structural reform by 
attributing credit and financial disparities to cultural and personal 
differences instead of systemic, institutional discrimination. Credit card 
corporations stand to gain substantial profits from exploiting these racial 
tropes and, therefore, have a significant investment in perpetuating 
them. Additionally, in some cases, discrimination by credit card 
companies might not merely reflect profit-seeking efforts, but also the 
explicit and implicit biases of individual employees that arise from 
exposure to these stereotypes. 
Specifically, powerful archetypes, such as the “welfare queen” and 
the “thug,” perpetuate stereotypes of Black women and men as 
materialistic, criminal overspenders. The welfare queen is a Black single 
mother who irresponsibly reproduces so that she can collect government 
benefits and live beyond her means.251 In her case, reproduction is an act 
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of fraud against the government.252 Therefore, the trope goes, Black 
women should have restricted access to money and credit.253 The reality 
of single Black mothers’ lives differs radically from what this portrait 
suggests. Nonetheless, this powerful, false image influences society’s 
vision of all Black women, contributing to a public blindness to the 
reality of race and poverty in the context of personal credit. 
The myth of the welfare queen became popular through stories told 
by Ronald Reagan, during his 1976 presidential campaign, about Linda 
Taylor, a Chicago woman who had defrauded the government out of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.254 Taylor came to represent to the 
public all poor Black women and all Black single mothers.255 This story 
of the welfare queen subsequently informed policymakers and 
government workers on issues ranging from how to police women in 
public housing to how to treat pregnant women who do drugs.256 It also 
cautioned against putting cash into these women’s hands under any 
circumstances.257 Therefore, banks or other companies that extend credit 
to Black women essentially perform an act of charity, taking a great risk 
for which they should be (over) compensated. 
Testing the power of the welfare queen myth, political scientist 
Shanto Iyengar found that, when presented with the image of a Black 
mother on welfare, viewers commonly attributed her need for benefits 
to her own personal failings instead of to public policy, historical 
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_her_a_notorious_american_villain.html [https://perma.cc/TT46-YX4A (staff-uploaded archive)] 
(“She used 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social 
Security, veterans’ benefits for four nonexistent, deceased veteran husbands, as well as 
welfare. Her tax-free cash income alone has been running $150,000 a year.” (quoting 
President Reagan’s characterization of the welfare queen at a presidential campaign rally in 
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 255. See Rich, supra note 251, at 260. 
 256. See Priscilla Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration, and the Shackling 
of Pregnant Prisoners, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1239, 1271 (2012); Priscilla Ocen, The New 
Racially Restrictive Covenants: Race, Welfare and the Policing of Black Women in Public 
Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1562–63 (2012).  
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discrimination, or any other structural factor.258 Many Whites have no 
significant interaction with Blacks that would counter this false 
perception.259 This racial segregation accounts for their inability to filter 
stereotypical images presented by popular culture, including news 
media, through their own lived experiences and understand these 
stereotypes as incorrect and harmful.  
Instead, people often buy into a narrative script that equates 
welfare and poverty with Black single motherhood. A further study by 
Franklin Gilliam found that repeated exposure to this script leads to and 
reinforces the views: that receiving welfare is a result of personal 
failings; the government should cut spending on welfare; and women 
should take on traditional gender roles that entail financial dependency 
on men.260 Further, even though significantly more Whites than Blacks 
receive welfare, the majority of images of welfare recipients in the media 
are of Blacks.261 
Similarly, the popular image of the thug influences perceptions of 
Black male creditworthiness. The thug appears in countless hip hop 
videos,262 an entire genre of movies focused on urban life,263 and 
 
 258. SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION 
AND AMERICAN PERCEPTION 39–42 (1987) (examining the affect Television has on 
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Political Issues, 546 AM. ACADEMY POL. & SOC. SCI. 59, 66 (1996). See also Franklin D. 
Gilliam, Jr., The ‘Welfare Queen’ Experiment: How Viewers React to Images of African-
American Mothers on Welfare, 53 NIEMAN REP., Summer 1999, at 49, 50 (discussing Shanto 
Iyengar’s results from a series of laboratory experiments that tested viewers’ assumptions of 
women on welfare after seeing depictions of “a black welfare mother in the television news”). 
 259. Gilliam, supra note 258, at 50–51. 
 260. Id. at 49–52; see also FRANKLIN D. GILLIAM, JR., FRAMEWORKS INST., THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF A NEW RACIAL DISCOURSE 11–13 (2006), http://www
.frameworksinstitute.org/assets/files/PDF/gilliam_memo1106.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS8Q-
B54B]. 
 261. See RACE AND POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 111 (Sanford F. Schram, Joe Soss & 
Richard C. Fording, eds., 2003) (tracing the racialization of poverty and noting that from 1950 
to 1992 the percentage of Blacks depicted in newsmagazine photos of the poor increased from 
twenty percent to more than sixty percent and peaked at almost seventy-five percent in 1972); 
Arthur Delaney & Alissa Scheller, Who Gets Food Stamps? White People, Mostly, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2015, 7:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/28/food-
stamp-demographics_n_6771938.html [https://perma.cc/EQD4-SZT3] (noting that 40.2% of 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) recipients in 2013 were White, while 
25.7% of SNAP recipients in 2013 were Black). 
 262. See, e.g., 50 Cent, Many Men (Wish Death), YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 2010), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=rnGZFzTAuAM; Akon, Locked Up ft. Styles P, YOUTUBE (June 16, 
2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=14PgWitIbSk; C-Murder, Y’all Heard of Me, 
YOUTUBE (July 7, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VbMuPvaxwn4; Boosie Badazz, 
Problem, YOUTUBE (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_cPOv9ZE7Oo. For a 
general overview of masculinity in hip-hop and the stereotypes it perpetuates, see generally 
Petra Filipová, Images of African-American Masculinity in Hip Hop Music (2011) 
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unbalanced media portrayals of crime.264 Racism in the criminal justice 
system and mass incarceration265 further reinforce this historical, 
“cartoonish, one-dimensional image[] of black men as sex-crazed, 
materialistic criminals.”266 Elements of this stereotype include 
ostentatious dress, such as oversized jewelry and designer sneakers, and 
a taste for the finer things in life.267 The thug’s desire to live the high life 
at all costs contributes to perceptions of Black men as individuals 
consistently purchasing beyond their means who are therefore unworthy 
of credit. 
Both the welfare queen and the thug are modern incarnations of 
stereotypes with deep roots. During slavery, images in popular culture, 
 
(unpublished Master thesis, University of Pardubice), https://dk.upce.cz/bitstream/handle
/10195/40478/DP_poslat.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/3TTM-ZD4Q]. 
 263. See, e.g., BARBERSHOP (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2002); BARBERSHOP 2: BACK IN 
BUSINESS (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2004); BOYZ N THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures Corp. 
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NEXT FRIDAY (New Line Cinema & Cube Vision 2000). 
 264. See, e.g., Travis L. Dixon, Psychological Reactions to Crime News Portrayals of Black 
Criminals: Understanding the Moderating Roles of Prior News Viewing and Stereotype 
Endorsement, 73 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 162, 162 (2006); Travis L. Dixon & Daniel Linz, Race 
and the Misrepresentation of Victimization on Local Television News, 27 COMM. RES. 547, 547 
(2000); Travis L. Dixon & Keith B. Maddox, Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality 
Judgments: Priming the Stereotype of the Dark and Dangerous Black Criminal, 35 J. APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1555, 1555 (2005); Ryan J. Hurley et al., Viewer Ethnicity Matters: Black 
Crime in TV News and Its Impact on Decisions Regarding Public Policy, 71 J. SOC. ISSUES 
155, 155 (2015). 
 265. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How 
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 400 (2006); 
Robert M. Entman & Kimberly A. Gross, Race to Judgment: Stereotyping Media and Criminal 
Defendants, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 4, Autumn 2008, at 93, 102–03; Gary Ford, The 
New Jim Crow: Male and Female, South and North, from Cradle to Grave, Perception and 
Reality: Racial Disparity and Bias in America’s Criminal Justice System, 11 RUTGERS RACE & 
L. REV. 324, 330 (2010). 
 266. Lauren Carter, The Black Thug Stereotype, RAP REHAB (Jan. 30, 2014), http://
raprehab.com/richard-sherman-rap-music-and-the-black-thug-stereotype/ [https://perma.cc
/4869-X5W4]; see also Commentary, All Things Considered: The Racially Charged Meaning 
Behind the Word ‘Thug’, NPR (Apr. 30, 2015, 5:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/30
/403362626/the-racially-charged-meaning-behind-the-word-thug [https://perma.cc/VC36-QZPU] 
(discussing the use of the word “thug” to describe Baltimore rioters). 
 267. See BEN BURGESS, JR., Stereotypes, in TIMES HAVE CHANGED AND LIFE IS 
STRANGE: COLLECTIVE WORKS OF URBAN POETRY AND STORY-TELLING 30, 30 (2008) 
(describing “new sneakers and baggy clothes” as stereotypical “characteristics of a thug”); 
Annabel Fenwick Elliott, Photographer Creates Powerful Portraits of Nurses, Pastors and 
CEOs Dressed as Terrorists, Thugs and Vagrants to Challenge Social Stereotypes, DAILY 
MAIL.COM (Oct. 2, 2014, 9:13 EDT), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2777122
/Photographer-creates-powerful-portraits-nurses-pastors-CEOs-dressed-terrorists-thugs-vagrants-
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“thug” clothing, which includes several large pieces of jewelry). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2017) 
2017] RACISM IN THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY 1115 
such as the Sambo and the Savage, commonly portrayed Blacks as less 
than human.268 In the Reconstruction era, Whites had strong emotional 
reactions to seeing recently freed Blacks spend money and engage in 
previously forbidden activities such as going out to theatres and 
restaurants.269 From that time, society has framed Black consumerism, 
particularly when it is ostentatious, as deviant and morally corrupt.270  
Regina Austin eloquently summarizes the common understanding 
of the relationship between Blacks and money as follows: “It is assumed 
that blacks do not earn their money honestly, work for it diligently, or 
spend it wisely. When blacks have money, they squander it and cannot 
save it.”271 Austin further explains that, through this lens, the companies 
or individuals who seek to exploit these assumed propensities to remain 
ignorant of financial best practices and overspend are blameless.272 The 
onus is on Blacks to wise up or suffer the consequences: caveat 
emptor.273 
In contrast, some social critics argue that stereotypes about Black 
consumerism are not false; instead, they assert that these portrayals 
accurately represent overspending as a form of resistance exercised by 
Black consumers, an expression of freedom.274 From this perspective, 
“consumption is about pleasure, performance, and participation in 
prosperity.”275 It is also “the site of a struggle to exploit the 
transformative potential of commodities” by using them “in ways that 
reveal the repressed or negated contradictions that underlie their 
production and distribution.”276  
An example of this type of radical conspicuous consumerism exists 
in the hip hop fashions popularized in the 1990s. Black designers took 
expensive designer labels and enlarged them or created patterns of these 
logos to cover clothing and accessories in order to exaggerate the status 
 
 268. ETHNIC NOTIONS, supra note 229 (explaining that by reducing Blacks to dumb, 
primitive caricatures, these stereotypes justified their enslavement). 
 269. See Freeman, supra note 37, at 185 (citing Hannah Rosen, “Not That Sort of Women”: 
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1999)). 
 270. Nathaniel Mills, Playing the Dozens and Consuming the Cadillac: Ralph Ellison and 
Civil Rights Politics, 61 TWENTIETH-CENTURY LITERATURE 147, 160 (2015). 
 271. Austin, supra note 203, at 151. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See id. at 154–56. 
 274. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 203, at 154, 160; Roopali Mukherjee, The Ghetto 
Fabulous Aesthetic in Contemporary Black Culture: Class and Consumption in the Barbershop 
Films, 20 CULTURAL STUD. 599, 612 (2006). 
 275. Austin, supra note 203, at 160. 
 276. Id. 
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achieved by the wearer through designer clothing.277 This style became 
so popular that it entered the mainstream and allowed certain Black hip 
hop artists and designers access to previously untapped fashion 
markets.278 Roopali Mukherjee argues that this style—often called 
“bling” or “ghetto fabulous”—disrupts social expectations because it 
“points to African Americans indulging in conspicuous consumption as 
their ticket to the American Dream, their way into the American 
polity.”279 In this way, Black consumption can be truly transformative 
because it signals a shift from Blackness-as-commodity to Black-as-
consumer.280 
Conversely, others contest popular stereotypes by viewing Black 
consumption as a symptom of alienation, a way to compensate for lives 
filled with micro-aggressions281 and ever-present threats of violence, 
discrimination, exploitation, and humiliation.282 This type of 
consumption, however, can ultimately cause more harm than good 
because it buys into a capitalist framework that equates consumption 
with status and material acquisitions with the good life.283 In reality, 
dollars can never buy acceptance and equality. Advocates for racial 
justice, therefore, lament any attempts by Blacks to consume solely in 
order to accomplish or signal upward social mobility, particularly to the 
extent that this consumption replaces a struggle against White 
supremacy.284  
A widely accepted equation of Blacks with materialistic 
overspending helps to explain the lack of effective legal recourse for 
discriminatory treatment against Black consumers under the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act.285 Additionally, due to the internalization of 
common, powerful stereotypes about Black creditworthiness, many 
 
 277. See, e.g., FRESH DRESSED (Mass Appeal 2015); see also Sacha Jenkins, The Spirit of 
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 283. Id. at 164. 
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Black consumers may not view their treatment by credit card companies 
as discriminatory, but instead mistakenly perceive it as merely reflective 
of their weak financial standing. 
Further, despite the overwhelming evidence that debt disparities 
are a product of laws and policies,286 very few people view credit card 
debt as a structural, rather than personal, problem.287 Critiques of 
personal financial management, whether they are benign (originating 
from members of the Black community seeking to uplift themselves and 
others)288 or hostile (expressed by White voters and politicians as 
justification for withholding certain benefits),289 tend to ascribe debt to 
personal failings. Reflecting this popular paradigm, a proliferation of 
materials promises to help individuals, and Blacks in particular, improve 
their financial standing.290 This literature, however, ignores the structural 
realities that place many Blacks in a precarious financial position, 
making credit simultaneously more necessary and more difficult to 
obtain. 
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The following Part explains why the current legal regime designed 
to protect consumers from racial disparities and discrimination fails to 
do so. 
II.  HOW CONSUMER LAW FAILS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
Consumer law is ill-equipped to police or redress inequitable 
treatment. Historically, consumer law has offered very limited 
protection to consumers.291 Its restricted nature, in large part, reflects its 
position in the consumer capitalist society. Consumer law seeks 
primarily to encourage, not inhibit, consumption. Therefore, despite its 
somewhat deceptive name, it tends to favor corporate interests. 
Credit card companies are profit-seeking corporations that exploit 
consumer weaknesses in order to maximize their earnings, benefit their 
shareholders, and increase their power.292 Moreover, the consolidation 
of the credit card industry over time into an oligopoly dominated by two 
major players, Visa and Mastercard, with only a handful of other 
contenders, has left consumers with very few options when it comes to 
credit card terms and conditions.293 Further, the greater the need 
individuals have for credit, the more susceptible they become to 
discriminatory and predatory practices. The founder of Providian 
Financial Services, Andrew Kahr, demonstrated how knowledge of this 
vulnerability permeates credit card companies’ approach to poor 
consumers in a memo stating, “Is any bit of food too small to grab when 
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you’re starving and when there is nothing else in sight? The trick is 
charging a lot, repeatedly, for small doses of incremental credit.”294 
Confronted with this merciless business philosophy and the 
immense power held by the credit card industry, it is inevitable that 
consumers suffer at the hands of their credit providers. This Part 
describes the laws currently in place to respond to this eventuality. The 
first, the ECOA, allows plaintiffs to bring suits against credit providers 
for unlawful discrimination.295 Unfortunately, however, these suits rarely 
resolve in plaintiff’s favor, often because they require them to prove 
intentional discrimination, a nearly impossible task.296 The second, the 
CRA,297 takes more of a preventive approach to the problem. It requires 
lending institutions to serve the needs of the communities in which they 
are located.298 Banks rarely follow this admonition, however, due to 
erratic enforcement and their ability to flee low-income communities 
and relocate to wealthier neighborhoods or serve online constituents.299 
Fundamental weaknesses in both laws thus render their combined effect 
negligible in terms of preventing or penalizing racial discrimination by 
credit card companies. 
A. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
The enactment of the ECOA in 1974 reflected the efforts of a 
coalition of feminist organizations that decried widespread credit 
discrimination against women.300 The five forms of credit discrimination 
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against women that catalyzed the Act were that (1)	single women had 
more trouble obtaining credit than single men; (2)	creditors generally 
required a woman to reapply for credit upon marriage, usually in her 
husband’s name, while similar reapplication was not necessary for 
newlywed men; (3)	creditors were unwilling to extend credit to a 
married woman in her own name; (4)	creditors were generally unwilling 
to count the wife’s income when a married couple applied for credit, 
even if she provided the sole support for the household; and (5)	divorced 
or widowed women had trouble reestablishing credit.301 Although not 
mentioned in the Act, perhaps the most egregious form of 
discrimination was some mortgage lenders’ requirement of proof of a 
wife’s birth control or sterilization before guaranteeing a married couple 
a loan.302 
After the National Commission on Consumer Finance heard 
testimony on these issues in 1972, the National Organization of 
Women’s (“NOW”) Task Force on Consumer Credit received an 
outpouring of similar stories in support of its lobbying efforts.303 At the 
same time, the American Civil Liberties Union, Parents Without 
Partners, and the Women’s Equity Action League began to investigate 
credit discrimination complaints.304 After Ralph Nader’s organization 
donated $10,000 to NOW for the cause, economist Jane Roberts 
Chapman and attorney Margaret Gates formed the Center for Women 
Policy Studies, and the Ford Foundation further enabled their research 
with a $40,000 grant.305 
The resulting efforts proved successful, culminating in Congress 
enacting the ECOA in 1974.306 Its passage reflected the growing 
importance of credit and concerns about the possible effects of 
discriminatory and arbitrary standards for determining creditworthiness 
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on individuals’ ability to exercise constitutionally guaranteed rights.307 
The first version of the ECOA focused almost entirely on the 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status,308 
despite some testimony on racially discriminatory credit lending 
practices,309 including testimony on the effect of intersectional 
discrimination on women of color.310 Two years later, Congress amended 
the ECOA to add protections against unfair credit lending practices on 
the bases of age, religion, race, color, and national origin.311 
The ECOA is the primary source of consumer protection against 
racial discrimination by credit card companies. Nonetheless, despite 
documentation of persistent and significant discrimination in this 
industry since the law’s enactment in 1974,312 to date there have been 
only three major settlements in favor of plaintiffs alleging discrimination 
by credit card companies on the basis of race or national origin.313 This 
 
 307. See NAT’L COMM’N ON CONSUMER FIN., supra note 301, at 1–4; Linda S. Hume, A 
Suggested Analysis for Regulation of Equal Credit Opportunity, 52 WASH. L. REV. 335, 335–38 
(1977); see also To Amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974: Hearings on H.R. 3386 
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking, Currency & Hous., 
94th Cong. 98 (1975) (statement of Homer L. Stewart, Jr., Senior Vice President, Republic 
Bank of Dallas); Credit Discrimination: Hearings on H.R. 14856 and H.R. 14908 Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 93rd Cong. 1 
(1974) (Hon. Leonor K. Sullivan, Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the H. 
Comm. on Banking & Currency) [hereinafter Credit Discrimination Hearings].  
 308. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, §	701, 88 Stat. at 1521–22. 
 309. See, e.g., Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 307, at 41 (statement of John H. 
Powell, Jr., Chairman, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n) (“[I]t is very likely that the 
inability to obtain credit, or if obtained, the discriminatory terms and conditions which 
accompany its extension to certain groups in our society, are directly related to discrimination 
in employment.”); id. at 131 (statement of Hon. Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n 
on Civil Rights, and Comm’r, Admin. on Aging, Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare).  
 310. Id. at 131–37 (statement of Hon. Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n on 
Civil Rights, and Comm’r, Admin. on Aging, Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare).  
 311. Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, §	701, 90 Stat. 251, 251 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §	1691(a) (2012)).  
 312. Cohen-Cole, supra note 155, at 702; Lin, supra note 152, at 45–50. 
 313. Consent Order at 10–13, United States v. Synchrony Bank, No. 2:14-CV-00454 (D. 
Utah June 27, 2014), ECF No. 16; Settlement Agreement and Order at 10–12, United States v. 
Fidelity Fed. Bank, No. CV-02-3906 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2002), https://www.clearinghouse.net
/chDocs/public/FH-NY-0021-0002.pdf  [https://perma.cc/WVJ7-5ZXL]; Settlement Agreement 
at 2, United States v. Assocs. Nat’l Bank, 1:99-cv-00196-SLR (D. Del. 1999), https://www
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-DE-0002-0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WZQ-NJ7W]; 
VANITA GUPTA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY AMENDMENTS OF 1976, at 3–4 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2015/04/13/ecoareport2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6HKQ-4LSF]; R. Alexander Acosta, The Attorney General’s 2002 Annual Report to 
Congress Pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Amendments of 1976, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
(Sept. 2003), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/ecoa2002.php [https://perma.cc
/22PV-Q7AM] (discussing Fidelity’s $1.6 million settlement with plaintiffs concerning 
allegations of harassment based on customers’ “Hispanic national origin”); William R. 
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fact suggests that the substance or procedure of the law may be tipped in 
defendants’ favor, and analysis of how these cases often proceed in court 
bear out this suspicion. Specifically, in this era of post-racialism, overt 
racism is socially unacceptable, such that credit providers rarely, if ever, 
make blatantly racist statements. Consequently, plaintiffs consistently 
lack “smoking gun” evidence of discrimination. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court has not decided whether plaintiffs may rely on statistics 
to prove discrimination under a disparate impact analysis.314 This 
uncertainty leads to confusion and inconsistency among the lower 
courts.315 
Additionally, because the law does not require credit card 
companies to collect and report data on the racial breakdown of their 
customers and applicants, plaintiffs rarely have access to the statistics 
they need to prove discrimination under a “disparate impact” theory.316 
Therefore, absent or awaiting significant legal reform to the adjudication 
of discrimination cases, the ECOA is of little use to borrowers denied 
access to necessary or fair credit due to their race. 
The ECOA provides that it is “unlawful for any creditor to 
discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit 
transaction	.	.	.	on the basis of race.”317 The law defines an “adverse 
 
Yeomans, The Attorney General’s 2000 Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 2001), https://www
.justice.gov/crt/housing-and-civil-enforcement-cases-documents-162 [https://perma.cc/2933-
83XG] (detailing plaintiff’s claims of discrimination on the basis of national origin by 
Associates National Bank and the subsequent $1.5 million settlement). 
 314. Leonard N. Chanin, Credit Cards May be Vulnerable to “Disparate Impact” Claims, 
AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK (Nov. 12, 2013, 10:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com
/opinion/credit-cards-may-be-vulnerable-to-disparate-impact-claims [https://perma.cc/6PTC-
ETPR(staff-uploaded archive)] (analyzing the issue in light of the decision that disparate 
impact applies in Fair Housing Act claims in Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), and noting that key 
language in the FHA that the Court interpreted to point to Congressional intention to allow 
disparate impact claims is missing from the ECOA). 
 315. See Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 963 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005) (expressing 
some uncertainty as to whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ECOA but 
ultimately assuming that they are); Ramirez v. GerrnPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 
2d 922, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (allowing disparate impact claim under the ECOA to proceed); 
see also Francesca Lina Procaccini, Stemming The Rising Risk of Credit Inequality: The Fair 
and Faithful Interpretation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s Disparate Impact 
Prohibition, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S43, S70 (2015) (outlining arguments that courts are 
frequently presented as to why disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the ECOA). 
 316. See, e.g., Golden, 404 F.3d at 963. 
 317. 15 U.S.C. §	1691(a) (2012). The ECOA, as enacted in 1974, prohibited financial 
institutions from discriminating on the grounds of marital status or gender. Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §	502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §	1691 (2012)). Congress added race, color, religion, national origin, age, the receipt 
of public assistance income, and the good faith exercise of any right under the Consumer 
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action” as “a denial or revocation of credit, a change in the terms of an 
existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially 
the amount or on substantially the terms requested.”318 As part of an 
initial challenge to an adverse action, an applicant is entitled to a 
statement of specific reasons for the action by the creditor.319  
The regulations associated with the statute, promulgated by the 
Federal Reserve, also state that a creditor may not discourage 
prospective credit applicants from applying based on a protected 
ground.320 A creditor may not inquire about a person’s race or national 
origin in relation to a credit transaction (including persons other than 
the applicant), but may inquire into an applicant’s permanent residence 
or immigration status.321 As an exception to this rule, the regulations 
allow for the existence of a “special purpose credit program” where a 
creditor may extend credit to a class of persons who otherwise likely 
would not receive such credit or would receive it on less favorable 
terms.322 For the purposes of establishing eligibility for one of these 
programs, creditors may inquire into otherwise prohibited areas, such as 
race and national origin.323 
If an individual suspects that a credit issuer has violated their rights 
under the ECOA, they may complain to the creditor, ask the state 
attorney general’s office for advice, sue the creditor in federal court 
individually or as part of a class action, or report violations to the 
appropriate government agency.324 In the event of a suit, the ECOA 
allows for actual damages, punitive damages, equitable relief, and 
attorneys’ fees.325 Some district courts analyze ECOA cases using the 
same standards as cases alleging employment discrimination under Title 
 
Credit Protection Act as prohibited grounds for discrimination in 1976 amendments. Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, §	701(a), 90 Stat. 251, 251 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §	1691 (2012)). Amendments in 1988 extended protection 
to small business credit applicants in addition to consumers. Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-533, §	301, 102 Stat. 2689, 2692 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §	1691b(a) (2012)); DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, 1 CONSUMER 
CREDIT AND THE LAW §	3:1, at 182–83 (2010–2011 ed. 2010).  
 318. 15 U.S.C. §	1691(d)(6).  
 319. Id. §	1691(d)(2)–(3).  
 320. 12 C.F.R. §	202.5(b) (2016).  
 321. Id. §	202.5(b), (e).  
 322. Id. §	202.8(a)(3).  
 323. Id. §	202.8(b)(2).  
 324. FED. TRADE COMM’N, YOUR EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY RIGHTS 8–9 (2013), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0071-equal-credit-opportunity.pdf#page=1&zoom
=auto,-136,19 [https://perma.cc/MWF4-GFK6]. 
 325. 15 U.S.C. §§	1691e(a)–(d), 1691(d) (2012).  
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VII of the Civil Rights Act.326 Under Title VII jurisprudence, plaintiffs 
who lack smoking gun evidence of the prohibited acts must follow the 
analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.327  
The McDonnell Douglas test first requires the plaintiff to establish 
a prima facie case of discrimination.328 This is a low hurdle to clear 
because a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by demonstrating four 
relatively simple facts that led to the instigation of a suit.329 First, the 
plaintiff must show that they are a member of the protected class—in 
this case, a racial minority.330 Second, they must demonstrate that they 
were qualified to receive a benefit from the creditor, such as a credit 
card or a higher credit limit.331 Third, they must prove that the creditor 
refused to grant them this benefit and, finally, they must demonstrate a 
“causal nexus between the harm suffered and the plaintiff’s membership 
in a protected class[.]”332 During this initial phase, some courts allow 
plaintiffs to proceed under a disparate impact theory, which allows the 
use of statistics to establish a prima facie case.333 
 
 326. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp, 621 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that “McDonnell Douglas tests should be applied to lending discrimination claims 
brought under §	1981”); Hood v. Midwest Sav. Bank, 95 Fed. App’x 768, 781 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Moore v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. ex rel. Farmer’s Home Admin., 55 F.3d 991, 993 n.5 (5th Cir. 
1995) (noting that although there is little ECOA case law to guide courts, the similarities 
between cases involving the refusal to extend credit and those involving refusals to hire 
allowed the lower court to borrow from the Title VII framework in its ECOA analysis); 
Frederick v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 14-CV-5460 AJN, 2015 WL 5521769, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015), opinion amended on reconsideration sub nom. Frederick v. Capital 
One (USA) N.A., No. 14-CV-5460 (AJN), 2015 WL 8484560 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2015); 
Germain v. M & T Bank Corp., 111 F.Supp.3d 506, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Boardley v. 
Household Fin. Corp. III, 39 F.Supp.3d 689, 709–10 (D. Md. 2014); Lugo-Berrios v. Citibank, 
N.A., No. CIV. 11-1224 JAF, 2013 WL 1314752, at *2 (D.P.R. Mar. 26, 2013); But see 
Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 714–15 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
McDonnell Douglas test does not apply in claims of credit discrimination). 
 327. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 328. Id.  
 329. Id.  
 330. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802; Anderson, 621 F.3d at 275. 
 331. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802; Anderson, 621 F.3d at 275. 
 332. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 275; see McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 333. See, e.g., Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 963 (6th Cir. 2005); Taylor v. 
Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1067 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (collecting cases). 
Not all courts allow use of this theory, however, due to doubts about the reliability of the data 
presented. See, e.g., Bhandari v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1101 (5th Cir.); 
O’Dowd v. S. Cent. Bell, 729 F.2d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1984); Umney v. Cmty. Fin. Members 
Fed. Credit Union, No. CIV.A. 14-13328, 2015 WL 4530264, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2015); 
Germain v. M & T Bank Corp., 111 F.Supp.3d 506, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Chau v. Ball, No. 
5:13-CV-233-JMH, 2014 WL 1338683, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 28, 2014); Craig E. Marcus, Note, 
Beyond the Boundaries of the Community Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: 
Developing a Market-Based Framework for Generating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 
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After the plaintiff meets these four elements, the burden shifts to 
the defendant-creditor to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the challenged action.334 This requirement is also not difficult to 
satisfy. Defendants can usually put forth a reasonable business 
justification for making a particular credit decision, most likely that the 
risk of borrowing appeared to be too great.335 In response, the plaintiff 
can attempt to prove that the defendant’s proffered reason was merely 
pretextual.336 To make this argument, the plaintiff could assert, for 
example, that White applicants with similar or worse credit histories 
received superior cards and terms.337 Proving this assertion, however, is 
difficult, if not impossible, because plaintiffs possess limited, if any, 
access to this type of information absent disclosure requirements.338 
Therefore, because the plaintiff has the burden to prove that illegal 
discrimination took place and the creditor need only present an 
acceptable motive for an adverse action, defendants generally prevail in 
these cases.339 
Courts do not always use the McDonnell Douglas framework, 
however, due to dissimilarities between the employment and the credit 
contexts.340 With allegations of employment discrimination, there is 
generally a point of comparison with other employees who are similarly 
situated yet receive different treatment, such as a promotion.341 Credit, 
on the other hand, does not usually involve competition. Borrowers do 
not vie for finite resources, and it is generally difficult, if not impossible, 
for plaintiffs to prove that others received better treatment from a credit 
 
 334. Marcus, supra note 333, at 736. 
 335. See Powell v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 481, 488 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding 
that defendant provided plaintiff with legitimate reasons for rejecting her application, such as 
lack of credit history, lack of collateral, and the absence of a co-signer). 
 336. Marcus, supra note 333, at 736. 
 337. See Boardley v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 39 F. Supp. 3d 689, 710 (D. Md. 2014) 
(finding that “Plaintiffs offer only conclusory allegations that others outside their protected 
class received loans on more favorable terms”). 
 338. Id.; Grant v. Vilsack, No. 5:10-CV-201-BO, 2011 WL 308418, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 
2011) (finding that “Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts plausibly demonstrating the 
existence of a single non-minority who was (1) of similar credit stature as the Plaintiff and (2) 
given more favorable financial or credit-related treatment than Plaintiff”). 
 339. See, e.g., Wise v. Vilsack, 496 Fed.Appx. 283, 285–86 (4th Cir. 2012); McDowell v. 
Huntington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 826 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1987); Willis v. Countrywide 
Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. CIVA CCB-09-1455, 2009 WL 5206475, at *8 (D. Md. Dec. 
23, 2009); Reece v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., No. 7:06-CV-181-0, 2008 WL 4559809, at 
*2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2008). 
 340. See text accompanying supra note 333. 
 341. See, e.g., Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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company based on their race. Nonetheless, many courts hold adverse 
treatment insufficient to prove discrimination.342  
To date, there have been three major ECOA investigations into 
race or national origin discrimination by credit card issuers resulting in 
settlements. All of them involved Latino borrowers. In 2000, plaintiffs 
alleged that Associates National Bank (“ANB”) discriminated on the 
basis of national origin by requiring higher credit scores for applicants 
using a Spanish-language application form, giving lower credit limits to 
approved Spanish-language applicants, and failing to offer favorable 
credit promotions to Spanish-language account holders.343 After a year 
of discovery, Citigroup acquired ANB and settled with the plaintiffs, a 
class of several hundred individuals, for $1.5 million.344  
In 2002, Fidelity Federal Bank settled a case brought by the United 
States alleging, among other things, that Fidelity engaged in abusive 
collection practices in its subprime credit card program that harassed 
customers based on their “Hispanic national origin” and denied credit to 
applicants who could not read or speak English.345 Fidelity paid out $1.6 
million to victims of its ECOA violations and agreed to fund a consumer 
education program.346 This aspect of the settlement appears to be of a 
self-serving nature, however, because it implies that the problem lies 
with the consumers’ lack of financial savvy, not the bank’s 
discriminatory practices. 
In 2014, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in a joint 
enforcement action with the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), ordered 
GE Capital Bank (“GE”) (which changed its name to Synchrony Bank 
shortly before the settlement) to pay $169 million to approximately 
108,000 borrowers.347 Over a three-year time span, GE allegedly denied 
these customers access to product promotions because of the customers’ 
 
 342. See, e.g., Boardley, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 710; Grant, 2011 WL 308418, at *2. 
 343. Complaint at 1, United States v. Assocs. Nat’l Bank, 1:99-cv-00196-SLR (D. Del. 
1999), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-DE-0002-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc
/6XAQ-WCPB]; Yeomans, supra note 313. 
 344. Settlement Agreement, supra note 313, at 2; Yeomans, supra note 313. 
 345. Settlement Agreement and Order, supra note 313, at 18; Complaint at 4, United 
States v. Fidelity Fed. Bank, No. 1:02-CV-03906 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2002), https://www
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-NY-0021-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP6H-U3SM]; 
Acosta, supra note 313. 
 346. Settlement Agreement and Order, supra note 313, at 10; Acosta, supra note 313; 
Yeomans, supra note 313. 
 347. Consent Order, supra note 313, at 17; CFPB Orders GE Capital to Pay $225 Million 
in Consumer Relief for Deceptive and Discriminatory Credit Card Practices, CFPB (June 19, 
2014), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-orders-ge-capital-to-pay-225-million-
in-consumer-relief-for-deceptive-and-discriminatory-credit-card-practices/ [https://perma.cc
/C5D3-BQNJ] [hereinafter CFPB Order Press Release].  
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Latino national origin.348 Specifically, between 2009 and 2012, GE 
offered certain qualifying borrowers the opportunity to receive a credit 
or waive their remaining account balances after paying a specified 
percentage of their balance.349 Customers who indicated a preference to 
communicate in Spanish or had Puerto Rico addresses did not receive 
notice of these promotions.350 Consequently, the settlement awarded 
these customers the amount they would have saved had they taken 
advantage of the offers.351 Interestingly, GE instigated the investigation 
itself by self-reporting its discriminatory practices to the CFPB, likely to 
avoid harsher penalties.352 The resulting court order represented the 
federal government’s largest settlement for credit card discrimination to 
date.353 
Despite these settlements, individual plaintiffs face an uphill battle 
establishing discrimination under the ECOA.354 This fact supports 
critiques of the McDonnell Douglas framework as it operates both in 
ECOA cases and in the context of employment discrimination.355 
Additionally, the lack of racial data on credit card lending prevents 
plaintiffs from proving their cases based on disparate impact in 
jurisdictions that allow those claims.356  
In summary, the ECOA’s significant shortcomings render it 
inadequate to influence corporate practices or to make whole 
individuals who experience racial discrimination by credit card 
companies. Even the rare settlements described above represent a small 
percentage of the profits that credit card companies stand to make by 
imposing unfair interest rates and fees on Black and Latino cardholders 
 
 348. Complaint at 4, United States v. Synchrony Bank, No. 2:14-CV-00454 (D. Utah, 
2014), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/505201461912455667192.pdf [https://perma.cc
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Credit Card Settlement, LAW360 (June 25, 2014, 9:05 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles
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 354. Majorie A. Shields, Discrimination Against Credit Applicant on Basis of Race or 
National Origin Under Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §	1691 et seq., 13 A.L.R. FED. 
3D ART. 9 (2016) (demonstrating, for example, that in the 1st through 6th circuit’s ECOA 
cases, plaintiffs won thirteen and defendants won forty-five). 
 355. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Essay, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, 34 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 257, 257 (2013). 
 356. See Winnie Taylor, Proving Racial Discrimination and Monitoring Fair Lending 
Compliance: The Missing Data Problem in Nonmortgage Credit, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
199, 201 (2011). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2017) 
1128 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
that should qualify for more favorable terms. These settlements 
therefore do not act as deterrents to unlawful conduct. Moreover, 
individual compensation represents a piecemeal approach to redressing 
and preventing discrimination that is unlikely to lead to significant 
change. The next Section evaluates the efficacy of the CRA, which 
contemplates a more holistic method of eliminating or reducing 
discrimination. 
B. The Community Reinvestment Act 
The impetus for the CRA came from concerns about urban decay 
in many of the United States’ major cities, particularly in low-income 
Black and Latino neighborhoods.357 Testimony in favor of the Act linked 
credit availability to urban blight, asserting that limited access to credit 
encouraged White flight and impeded the rehabilitation of deteriorating 
neighborhoods.358 The Act’s proponents focused specifically on the 
actions of large financial institutions that managed the money of small, 
minority-owned businesses and lower-income residents but refused to 
lend to or invest in these companies and communities, regardless of their 
creditworthiness.359 In short, the CRA was necessary to combat the 
racial discrimination that led to widespread disinvestment from lower-
income neighborhoods.360 Nonetheless, although the CRA committees 
heard and considered extensive testimony on racially discriminatory 
mortgage lending practices,361 no language within the CRA expressly 
mentions racial discrimination.  
Instead, banks’ hostility to the Act’s original objective of 
eliminating vestiges of redlining362 resulted in a watered-down, vague, 
and conditional statement of purpose: “to encourage such institutions to 
help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are 
chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such 
institutions.”363 Moreover, the CRA’s enforcement mechanism is so 
 
 357. H.R. REP. NO. 95-236, at 2–3 (1977). 
 358. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-236, at 2–4; Bernanke, supra note 100.  
 359. See Bernanke, supra note 100; Michael S. Barr, Credit Where it Counts: The 
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(1998). 
 361. See, e.g., Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 307, at 39–53 (statement of John 
H. Powell, Jr., Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).  
 362. See Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 307, at 39–53 (statement of John H. 
Powell, Jr., Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); Barr, supra note 359, at 
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weak that, in its current form, it appears to have a negligible impact on 
banks’ conduct.364 Nonetheless, its underlying principles could serve as 
the basis for a revamping of the law to transform it into a strong tool 
against racial discrimination in credit. 
The CRA authorizes regulators to make periodic assessments of 
banks’ compliance with the mandate to meet the needs of traditionally 
underserved communities located within their purview.365 The objectivity 
of these assessments, however, is questionable. First, banks possess a 
considerable degree of control over which entity regulates them. By 
creating either a state or a federal charter, a lending institution 
determines its regulator. The Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) regulate state-chartered banks.366 The 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) regulates nationally 
chartered banks.367 
Second, the companies that the OCC regulates provide funding for 
the agency.368 This relationship has the potential to erode the OCC’s 
desire to make objective, negative assessments. The OCC’s desire to 
keep its benefactors happy manifests itself, for example, in the steps it 
takes to protect the companies it regulates from potentially costly 
government attempts to protect consumers. To this end, the OCC has 
intervened in the efforts of several state attorney generals to crack down 
on credit card companies’ predatory practices.369 To halt these 
investigations, the OCC successfully argued that it, not the attorney 
generals’ offices, has sole jurisdiction over the institutions it regulates.370 
Further, the CRA assessment process appears to be ripe for abuse 
because it lacks definitive guidelines, allowing wide latitude for 
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BRIDGES, Summer 2003, at 4, 4, https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/publications
/pub_assets/pdf/br/2003/br_su_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA6X-EPSH] (suggesting that the 
effects of the CRA are unclear). 
 365. 12 U.S.C. §	2903(a).  
 366. 12 U.S.C. §§	248, 1811, 1813. The Office of Thrift Supervision also performed this 
function before its dissolution in 2011. See 12 U.S.C. §	5412. 
 367. 12 U.S.C. §	24; GARCÍA ET AL., supra note 222, at 35. 
 368. 12 U.S.C. §	16; GARCÍA ET AL., supra note 222, at 35. 
 369. GARCÍA ET AL., supra note 222, at 35 (citing Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, 
Credit Card Accountability 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 161 & n.26 (2006)). 
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You, CONSUMER REPS., Nov. 2005, at 12, 15). 
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discretion.371 The system works as follows: after examining a lending 
institution’s record serving low- and moderate-income (“LMI”) 
communities, the FDIC regulator selects one of four ratings, which 
include “Outstanding,” “Satisfactory” (which can be modified High or 
Low), “Needs To Improve,” or “Substantial Noncompliance.”372 The 
CRA does not list specific criteria for regulators’ evaluation of 
compliance. The FDIC asserts, however, that it considers, among other 
things, demographic data that reveals median income levels, household 
income distribution, housing costs, and the banks’ self-reported product 
offerings and business strategy.373  
Upon receipt of a poor rating, a bank receives a plan for 
improvement and must subsequently file public periodic reports 
describing its progress toward correction.374 In New York, the law 
prohibits banks with the poorest CRA ratings from holding public 
deposits.375 Additionally, the rating can affect how frequently the 
Federal Reserve makes future evaluations. A rating of Outstanding or 
Satisfactory serves to reduce the subsequent number of times that the 
Federal Reserve will assess a small bank.376 
CRA ratings are available to the public on the Internet.377 
Consumers’ ability to use this information to make decisions regarding 
which bank they wish to patronize represents one of the disciplinary 
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 374. See id. §	345.21(a)(4). 
 375. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §	106(C) (McKinney, Westlaw through ch. 7 2017). New 
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No. 114, 2013 Reg. Sess. (La. 2013).  
 376. See 12 U.S.C. §	2908(a), (c); NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., CRA MANUAL 25 
(2007), http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/pdf/cra_manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ65-Z687]. 
Small banks are banks with less than $1.216 billion in assets. 12 C.F.R. §	228.12(u) (2016). 
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aspects of the rating system. Also, community groups or media outlets 
may disseminate this information in efforts to affect a bank’s reputation 
and potentially damage its bottom line. These options, however, were 
primarily theoretical until amendments to the Act in 1989 and 1994 
rendered the ratings more accessible to the public, making enforcement 
through public pressure more viable.378 Simultaneously, with the 
introduction of monolithic, nationwide banks through the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,379 more 
community groups devoted to the protection of consumer interests 
emerged.380 
The chief enforcement mechanism of the CRA is the possibility that 
regulators will deny requests for mergers, acquisitions, closures, 
relocations, and new branches based on poor CRA performance.381 
Regulators can deny an application outright based on a poor rating, or 
give conditional approval pending steps taken to improve 
performance.382 In 1989, twelve years after its enactment, the Federal 
Reserve first denied a proposed merger, between the Continental 
Illinois Corporation and Grand Canyon State Bank, due to a poor 
rating.383 Since then, enforcement through this method remains 
extremely rare. In fact, a Federal Reserve Board official testified in 2007 
that the agency held only thirteen public meetings on mergers in the 
previous seventeen years, despite a trend toward major consolidations 
during that period.384 Further, although the Board received 13,500 
applications for mergers and new banks since 1988, it denied only 
 
 378. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA): CRA Ratings Search, supra note 377; see also 
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twenty-five of those proposals and rejected only eight due to consumer 
protection or community-needs issues.385 
Astonishingly, since the law’s inception in 1977, regulators have 
awarded ninety-seven percent of the banks they evaluated a rating of 
Satisfactory or Outstanding.386 These overwhelmingly positive 
assessments fail to reflect the reality of low-income borrowers who find 
themselves excluded from regular credit and banking institutions. In 
fact, many households turn to exploitative alternative lending 
businesses, such as payday lenders and pawn shops, to meet their credit 
and banking needs.387 In turn, most banks focus on lucrative, wealthy 
clients, and fail to improve community access to their services unless 
required to do so to accomplish one of their own objectives.388 This 
behavior is not unusual for a profit-seeking corporation. The desirability 
of tempering shareholder satisfaction with community responsibility, 
however, creates a need for regulatory intervention that the CRA 
appears unable to satisfy. 
Additionally, enforcement inconsistency renders some lending 
institutions skeptical of the CRA’s power. For example, in 2010, two 
New Jersey banks, Clifton Savings and Saddle River Valley, were the 
first in the state to receive poor CRA ratings since 2004, despite New 
Jersey’s significant, underserved LMI population.389 Both banks earned 
a Needs To Improve rating.390 In response, Clifton postponed a stock 
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offering originally planned for four days after the assessment became 
public.391 In contrast, Saddle River experienced no ascertainable 
consequences, and its CEO publicly expressed doubt that the rating 
would serve as an obstacle to the bank’s plans for future expansion.392 
A few years later, in 2014, national and state groups sought to block 
the acquisition of the Florida bank First United Bancorp by New 
Jersey’s Valley National Bancorp (“Valley”) based on Valley’s poor 
record of lending to low-income and Black households.393 The 
community groups referenced government data from 2012 revealing that 
Valley made only 4.5% of its home loans to low-income individuals, 
despite the fact that 41.5% of the households in northern New Jersey 
and New York City are low-income.394 Similarly, Valley reportedly gave 
only 1.5% of its home loans to Black households, which represented 
20.5% of the area’s population.395 Nonetheless, Valley received a CRA 
rating of High Satisfactory in 2013.396 
In rare cases, regulators have taken into account deceptive or 
predatory practices when making their assessments. In one such 
departure from the norm, the OCC gave Woodforest National Bank a 
Needs To Improve rating in 2012 based, not on its poor record of 
community investment, but on its unfair and deceptive overdraft 
program.397 The CRA report on this conduct led to a $32 million 
settlement with the government.398 The OCC, however, did not release 
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the Needs To Improve rating to the public until close to three years 
later.399 
Similarly, the FDIC bestowed a Substantial Noncompliance rating 
on Evergreen Bank Group because of the unusual practices of one of its 
members, Oak Brook bank.400 Oak Brook engaged in a national 
motorcycle lending business that offered variable interest rates, allowing 
a dealer to mark up rates and keep additional profits for itself as the 
originator of the loan.401 Based on this practice, the FDIC determined 
that the bank treated similar borrowers differently, in violation of the 
CRA’s principles.402 In response to the Substantial Noncompliance 
rating, Oak Brook shifted to a flat fee arrangement with its dealers.403 
Eagle Bank, based in Missouri, also made some changes based on a 
poor CRA rating. After receiving a Needs To Improve rating in 2012,404 
Eagle opened a branch in an economically diverse neighborhood.405 This 
new branch offered postal services and the ability to pay utility bills free 
of charge.406 Eagle also partnered with a number of other banks to create 
a construction loan fund for women and minority contractors featuring 
“relaxed qualifying criteria.”407 In May 2014, Eagle received a revised 
rating of Satisfactory.408 Similarly, in West Virginia, WesBanco’s CRA 
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assessment reported poor performance based on failure to make 
sufficient loans to minorities and LMI borrowers.409 The bank appealed 
its initial rating and ultimately passed the exam, but the delay caused by 
the appeal process postponed regulatory approval of a desired merger.410 
WesBanco consequently increased its lending to its underserved 
constituents.411 
In California, a community group, California Reinvestment 
Coalition, negotiated with Banc of California pending the bank’s 
acquisition of twenty former Banco Popular branches.412 As a result of 
this discussion, the bank committed to devoting twenty percent of its 
annual deposit earnings to public benefits and charitable lending for 
low-income members of the community.413 On several other occasions, 
proposed mergers have given community groups opportunities to lobby 
banks to make pledges to improve their CRA performance.414 A 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition (“NCRC”) report stated 
that banks have made $4.5 trillion in CRA agreements and 
commitments to LMI and minority communities,415 which may be due in 
part to this type of community pressure. Also, after the report’s release, 
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Bank of America pledged a further $1.5 trillion to LMI lending during 
its acquisition of Countrywide.416 The NCRC report also spurred further 
study by Federal Reserve economists, who concluded that banks make 
more home loans in areas covered by CRA agreements than in those 
where no pledges exist.417 
Additionally, community groups sometimes leverage CRA ratings 
simply for the opportunity to acquire a voice in the discussion of a 
bank’s proposed movements. For example, in 2015, several groups 
succeeded in persuading the Federal Reserve to hold a public hearing on 
the planned acquisition of OneWest Bank in Pasadena by New York-
based CIT Group Inc. due to CRA-related concerns.418  
Following this, albeit limited, success, activists sought a similar 
opportunity to voice their concerns about Royal Bank of Canada’s 
proposed $5.4 billion takeover of Los Angeles’s City National Corp. 
(“National”), relying in part on National’s CRA rating to insist on a 
public hearing.419 According to a representative of the Los Angeles 
Latino Chamber of Commerce, National catered primarily to wealthy 
clients, providing no services to East Los Angeles’s substantial Latino 
population, thereby widening the city’s racial wealth divide.420 In 2012, 
the OCC gave National a rating of Satisfactory because it made some 
loans to small businesses, despite the fact that most of its mortgage 
lending was to wealthy homeowners.421 Seeking to reduce opposition to 
the takeover from the Latino community, and in spite of its Satisfactory 
rating, National pledged to expand its commitments under the CRA and 
designate over $11 billion over five years for low-income customers and 
small businesses.422 The new pledge carved out mortgages specifically for 
minority borrowers.423 
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Concerned community activists in San Francisco similarly hoped to 
wield some power from the threat of poor CRA ratings to change the 
policies of First Republic Bank, a lending institution that reportedly 
services primarily wealthy customers.424 In August 2015, protesters 
picketed outside First Republic Bank’s headquarters in an effort to stop 
it from contributing to the displacement of the city’s residents.425 First 
Republic Bank allegedly provided loans to real estate investors who 
purchased property in San Francisco, evicted low-income and elderly 
tenants, and then sold the buildings to rich homeowners through 
California’s legal loophole of “tenancy in common” ownership.426 
California’s Ellis Act makes these evictions legal, despite the harm they 
do to low-income tenants who lack political clout.427 The California 
Reinvestment Coalition claims that First Republic Bank’s loans violate 
the CRA because they intentionally push renters out of the city instead 
of serving their needs.428 
In 2011, the FDIC gave First Republic Bank’s lending practice a 
rating of Low Satisfactory.429 The FDIC stated that First Republic 
Bank’s “distribution of borrowers reflects poor penetration among retail 
customers of different income levels and business customers of different 
revenue sizes, given the product lines offered by the bank.”430 In light of 
this statement and the claims of protesters, the rating, although low, 
seems generous. Moreover, it seems unlikely that it will have any 
negative impact on the bank. For example, Boston’s OneUnited Bank, a 
similar lending institution, received a Needs To Improve rating based 
 
11-billion-%E2%80%A8five-year-community-commitment [https://perma.cc/XKF7-RE3V]; 
Reckard, supra note 419. 
 423. City National Announces New $11 Billion, Five-Year Community Commitment, supra 
note 422. 
 424. Darwin BondGraham, Tenants Accuse San Francisco Bank of Financing Evictions, E. 
BAY EXPRESS (Aug. 18, 2015), http://m.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2015/08/18
/tenants-accuse-san-francisco-bank-of-financing-evictions [https://perma.cc/5T4J-KW6X].  
 425. Id.; see also Dayen, supra note 386.  
 426. BondGraham, supra note 424. 
 427. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§	7060–7060.7 (West, Westlaw through Ch.3 of 2017 Reg. 
Sess.); Lisa T. Alexander, Occupying the Constitutional Right to Housing, 94 NEB. L. REV. 
245, 247–48 (2015) (describing the ill effects of the Act).  
 428. BondGraham, supra note 424; Paulina Gonzales, CRC Guest Blog: Families Win 
When Banks Stop Funding Displacement, MEDA (Feb. 18, 2016), http://medasf.org/crc-guest-
blog-families-win-banks-stop-funding-displacement/ [https://perma.cc/DVF4-7PQZ]. 
 429. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NO. 59017, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: FIRST REPUBLIC BANK, at 2 (2011), https://www5.fdic.gov
/crapes/2011/59017_111031.PDF [https://perma.cc/H35J-Z7EG]. 
 430. Id. 
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upon its poor lending performance to low-income individuals,431 but still 
received the approval it sought for a bank closure.432 
Consequently, despite the occasional and notable opportunities that 
the CRA affords for greater community investment, leading scholars 
have criticized the law extensively from its inception.433 Much of this 
criticism focuses on its lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and 
the apparent collusion between regulators and the institutions they 
supervise.434 Despite the large arsenal of possible enforcement actions 
available, including cease and desist orders, formal agreements, and civil 
monetary penalties, Congress decided not to institute any of these as 
penalties for CRA non-compliance.435 Critics also point to the sporadic 
nature of evaluations and uneven or non-existent consequences for non-
compliance.436 
Even worse, some banks’ responses to potentially poor CRA 
ratings do more harm than good to households in need. For example, 
 
 431. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NO. 23966, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: ONEUNITED BANK 2 (2013), http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/docs
/dob/community-reinvestment-act/bosboc.pdf [https://perma.cc/RLL3-E4AK]. 
 432. Dierdre Fernandes, OneUnited Bank Closes L.A. Branch, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 18, 
2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/02/18/oneunited-closes-branch-that-was-
part-its-expansion/yiKGhib1cV2AjVRsEJ598H/story.html [https://perma.cc/QF6A-AUF4]; 
Beth Healy, OneUnited Bank Gets ‘Needs to Improve’ on Community Lending, BOS, GLOBE 
(Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/06/oneunited-bank-gets-needs-
improve-community-lending/ZWKcneQUTGsjusdhgveKSJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/76VY
-FMDV]. 
 433. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 299, at 519, 526–33; Raymond H. Brescia, Part of the 
Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and the Community Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C. 
L. REV. 617, 626–27 (2009); Raymond H. Brescia, The Community Reinvestment Act: Guilty, 
but Not as Charged, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 11–17 (2014); Cassandra Jones Havard, 
Advancing the CRA—Using the CRA’s Strategic Plan Option to Promote Community 
Inclusion: The CRA and Community Inclusion, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 37, 44–47 (2006); 
Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REV. 
827, 863 (2009); Keith N. Hylton, Development Lending and the Community Reinvestment 
Act, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 59, 67–69 (2006); Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, 
Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community 
Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237, 241–46 (1996); Michael Klausner, Market Failure and 
Community Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1592–93 (1995); A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment 
Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431, 1453–58 (1995). 
 434. See Barr, supra note 299, at 528–30 (cataloging arguments against the CRA). 
 435. Compare 12 U.S.C. §	1818(b)(1) (2012) (allowing federal agencies to bring cease and 
desist actions against financial institutions for “unsafe or unsound practice[s,]” violations of 
law, or breach of agreements with regulators), with id. §	2906(1) (requiring agencies to write 
reports evaluating “the institution’s record of meeting the credit needs of its entire 
community”). 
 436. See GETTER, supra note 386, at 8 (2015); Barr, supra note 299, at 529; Lawrence J. 
White, Essay, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Goals, Flawed Concept, COMMUNITY 
DEV. INV. REV., Feb. 2009, at 185, 187; Mark Willis, It’s the Rating, Stupid: A Banker’s 
Perspective on the CRA, COMMUNITY DEV. INV. REV., Feb. 2009, at 59, 59. 
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many banks simply move out of underserved areas, leaving a gap that 
exploitative fringe lenders are delighted to fill.437 In Chicago, for 
instance, low-income neighborhoods are home to only 2.3% of the city’s 
full-service banking branches.438 Moreover, savvy banks, such as 
JPMorgan and Wells Fargo, create partnerships with check cashing 
outlets and pay day lenders that remain to serve the areas that the banks 
no longer occupy.439 By financing these ventures, the banks have the 
potential to profit twofold from their flight from economically depressed 
areas, making greater yields elsewhere while keeping a hand in the 
earnings from the poor they leave behind.440 The CRA’s regulations do 
nothing to address or prevent these practices. 
Additionally, the CRA does not establish concrete guidelines for 
best practices, such as quotas for lending to LMI and minority 
individuals and businesses.441 It also does not require regulators to use 
an objective scale to determine best practices.442 Regulators simply 
compare banks to each other, and the different regulators do not 
coordinate or align their criteria.443 Significantly, banks that do business 
over the Internet can evade thorough CRA assessment due to the 
difficulty in accurately identifying the geographic scope of their 
clientele.444 Also, unsurprisingly, regulators generally establish 
 
 437. See Michael A. Stegman, Kelly Thompson Cochran & Robert Faris, Toward a More 
Performance-Driven Service Test: Strengthening Basic Banking Services Under the Community 
Reinvestment Act, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 405, 445 (2002). 
 438. GARCÍA ET AL., supra note 222, at 27. 
 439. See KEVIN CONNOR & MATTHEW SKOMAROVSKY, THE PREDATORS’ CREDITORS: 
HOW THE BIGGEST BANKS ARE BANKROLLING THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY 3 (2011), 
http://public-accountability.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/payday-final-091410.pdf [https://
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Crackdown on Predatory Lending: Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/22/payday-loans-banks_n_906765.html [https://perma.cc/LL56-
ZAPF]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Major Banks Aid in Payday Loans Banned by States, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/business/major-banks-aid-in-payday-
loans-banned-by-states.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/X9BN-NVPA]. 
 440. See Eichler, supra note 439. 
 441. See Willis, supra note 436, at 60. 
 442. Id. at 60–63. 
 443. Id. at 66. 
 444. See 12 U.S.C. §	2901(a)(1) (2012) (“[R]egulated financial institutions are required by 
law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and the needs of the 
communities in which they are chartered to do business[.]”); see also Raymond H. Brescia, 
The Community Reinvestment Act: Guilty, But Not as Charged, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 27 
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relationships with the banks that they oversee, not the communities that 
the CRA requires them to serve. Finally, although discriminatory 
lending provides grounds for a poor rating, it appears that regulators do 
no more than a cursory inquiry into whether this type of conduct is 
occurring.445 
These copious critiques of the CRA suggest that a complete 
overhaul is necessary to give teeth to the Act and effectively prevent 
exploitation and neglect of the poor by lending institutions. Nonetheless, 
the principles behind the CRA remain strong, and lend themselves 
nicely to a refashioning of the law into a tool to reduce or eliminate 
discrimination.446 The following Part proposes amendments to the 
CARD Act that draw on these principles. 
III.  CALL TO REFORM CONSUMER LAW BASED ON 
REHABILITATIVE REPARATIONS THEORY 
In light of the failure of the present legal regime to redress and 
deter racial discrimination against credit card consumers, it is instructive 
to turn to models outside of the ECOA’s anti-discrimination context for 
potential solutions. The reparations movement has long recognized that 
racially subordinated groups’ inferior social and economic statuses arise 
from historical and present injustices, and that the entities complicit in 
creating these conditions should take affirmative steps to transform 
them.447 Rehabilitative reparations focus on group, as opposed to 
individual, compensation for past harms.448 Slavery disclosure laws 
embody this theory of rehabilitative reparations by holding 
corporations, in addition to governments, responsible for their role in 
perpetuating and exploiting economic disparities based on social 
 
congressional action, the CRA will become functionally irrelevant with regard to Internet 
banking services because of the inherent geographic limitations of the existing regulatory 
scheme under the statute”). 
 445. Taylor & Silver, supra note 384, at 156 (“In most cases, even for the largest banks, the 
fair-lending section of the CRA exam reports in one to three sentences that the regulatory 
agency tested for evidence of illegal and discriminatory lending and that no such lending was 
found. Yet there is no discussion of what precisely had been done to reach its conclusion. In 
the past, agencies provided detailed descriptions in the fair-lending section of CRA exams 
under the “assessment factor” format of the exams. For example, under Assessment Factor F, 
which assessed evidence of discriminatory or illegal practices, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond in January 1996 conducted matched file reviews of more than 300 loan applications 
in a CRA exam of Signet Bank. The exam also described a regression analysis, which sought 
to determine if race was a factor in loan rejections.” (footnote omitted)). 
 446. See generally THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT (Thomas A. 
Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002) (discussing the issues surrounding consumer credit 
markets at the beginning of the twenty-first century and current policy debate). 
 447. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 205, at 2–3.  
 448. See infra notes 492–93 and accompanying text. 
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inequality and injustice.449 These laws, by requiring disclosure, advance 
one of the reparations movement’s main goals of truth-telling.450 
This Part interrogates rehabilitative reparations’ focus on 
community, instead of individual, repair, as well as slavery disclosure 
laws’ ability to hold corporations accountable for their complicity in 
racial injustice. It argues that the principles behind rehabilitative 
reparations and slavery disclosure laws establish a framework and 
support for requiring credit card companies that engage in racial 
discrimination or exploit racial inequality to make reparative 
investments into the communities they harm. The Part begins with a 
proposal to reform consumer law by enacting those requirements. 
A. Proposal to Reform Consumer Law 
The CARD Act should require credit card corporations held to 
discriminate against consumers based on race to make significant 
financial investments into the harmed communities. The definition of 
“discrimination” under the law should encompass, in addition to explicit 
racism, unconscious, implicit, and structural racism, demonstrable 
through statistical racial disparities that do not correlate to credit risk, as 
revealed in compulsory, frequent, and public reports. These reporting 
requirements should follow the model provided by the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (“HMDA”), and include the race, gender, and income of 
credit card applicants and borrowers, in addition to price data.  
Although the failure of HMDA’s disclosure requirements to 
prevent racial discrimination in mortgage lending casts some doubt on 
the potential of disclosure to lead to reform,451 it is possible that HMDA 
simply does not go far enough in its reporting requirements.452 To be 
useful, reporting must be comprehensive, and include every factor that 
goes into the creditworthiness determination, including neighborhood, 
affinities, and Facebook friends. Further, disclosure alone is insufficient 
to transform entrenched and profitable policies. Instead, accountability 
must form part of the law and the law must not be dependent on public 
response for enforcement. 
The cost of these investments should serve to deter credit card 
companies from further discrimination, and their substance should 
facilitate considerable economic growth in the communities that receive 
 
 449. See infra Section III.C. 
 450. See infra note 473–75 and accompanying text. 
 451. See Cassandra Jones Havard, Post-Racial Lending?, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 176, 
183 (2014).  
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them. For example, the investment might consist of the building and 
continued funding of educational institutions, affordable housing, or 
medical or legal clinics; large-scale business lending; or other significant 
support for projects designed to provide economic stability, essential 
and affordable services, and substantial entrepreneurial opportunities. 
The identification of companies engaged in culpable conduct would 
occur through reporting requirements mandating disclosure of predatory 
practices such as credit card redlining, as well as detailed data that would 
reveal unwarranted disparities: which consumers, classified by race and 
other protected categories, receive which cards, and under which terms. 
The studies conducted by Chi-Jack Lin453 and Ethan Cohen-Cole454 
documenting racial discrimination in the industry would provide 
direction on how to structure and analyze these disclosures.  
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should oversee these 
disclosures and create guidelines to establish the threshold of allowable 
disparities and appropriate consequences that correspond to culpability. 
The public nature of the disclosures would also facilitate community 
response to revealed discrimination, which can encourage compliance 
and, in some cases, lead to even more extensive, voluntary changes. 
The models for this proposal are the concept of rehabilitative 
reparations, which seeks redress for harms to racial groups through 
efforts directed at communities, instead of individuals;455 and slavery 
disclosure laws, which attempt to hold corporations accountable for 
profits derived from racist and exploitative practices.456 These innovative 
laws have elicited a number of substantial contributions from 
corporations to the Black community, despite the fact that the law does 
not require them.457 Taking these types of laws one step further, by 
compelling corporate investment in response to discriminatory practices, 
would encourage lenders to eliminate these practices through 
reconfiguration of the credit industry’s business model from one based 
on exploiting the most vulnerable consumers to one offering competitive 
services to consumers willing and able to pay for them.  
 
 453. See generally Lin, supra note 152 (finding statistical discrimination in the consumer 
credit market against Black and Hispanic consumers). 
 454. See generally Cohen-Cole, supra note 155 (finding evidence of race-based differences 
in the availability of credit). 
 455. See infra notes 492–94 and accompanying text. 
 456. See infra Section III.C.  
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B. Rehabilitative Reparations 
The reparations movement has gone through many transformations 
throughout history, encompassing a variety of wrongs committed against 
racial groups, from Japanese internment to the overthrow of the 
Hawaiian monarchy to slavery.458 This analysis focuses on slavery 
reparations. Although there is a broad range of opinions concerning 
what might, if anything, suffice to repair the lasting and monumental 
harms of slavery, reparations scholars generally agree that, in addition to 
acknowledgment and apology, some form of reconciliatory action or 
gesture is necessary.459  
In contrast, some opponents of reparations assert that, in a post-
racial United States, slavery no longer has lingering effects.460 For 
example, many post-racialists view the fact that Americans elected a 
Black President twice as evidence that racial barriers no longer exist in 
this country.461 Critical race scholars, in response, assert that Black 
exceptionalism is not evidence of the end of racism.462 Instead, in some 
cases, Obama’s presidency led to increased racial hostility toward 
Blacks.463 
The legal institution of slavery allowed for the cementing of White 
economic and social privilege through law. Since its abolishment, there 
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 463. See Mario Barnes & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Obama Effect: Understanding 
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have been concerted and continuing efforts to maintain the financial 
advantages it established for Whites.464 Laws and policies supporting 
these efforts include, inter alia, Jim Crow laws,465 the Social Security 
Act,466 the GI Bill,467 the Fair Housing Act,468 and the allocation of loans 
and benefits to farmers by the Department of Agriculture.469 
Reparations scholar Roy Brooks asserts that this history of 
discrimination renders Blacks who are living in the United States today 
direct victims of slavery.470 This perspective counters the contentions 
that reparations are irrelevant or inappropriate because slaves and all of 
their direct descendants are long deceased.471 
Supporting Brooks’ claim, a quick look at statistics related to 
wealth, income, health, and other measurements of societal success 
reveals that, in fact, Blacks and other groups historically subject to 
adverse social and legal treatment continue to lag behind Whites 
significantly.472 Some social critics argue that these disparities arise from 
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racially based cultural and personal inadequacies.473 On the contrary, 
they are evidence that the United States has failed to reverse the harms 
that its legal and political institutions have inflicted on Blacks and other 
groups subject to hegemony and occupation, such as Latinos, Native 
Americans, and Native Hawaiians.474 Reparations thus represent 
continued efforts to right these wrongs in tangible and meaningful ways 
that would allow Blacks and other historically marginalized groups to 
gain social and financial, not just formal, equality. 
In addition to seeking substantive results, there are rhetorical and 
psychological objectives underlying reparations advocacy. These goals 
include revealing and acknowledging truths, making apologies, and 
creating space for healing both within oppressed communities and in the 
relationships between the still-dominant White society and oppressed 
groups.475 To these ends, some reparations advocates have sought to 
establish truth commissions.476 Following this model, Brown University 
voluntarily formed a commission to investigate its history of slavery.477 
Additionally, Georgetown University’s president announced that it 
would accord legacy status to descendants of the slaves that the 
university sold in 1838.478 
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with University on Reparations, ADVOCATE (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.theadvocate.com
/baton_rouge/news/communities/westside/article_b221befe-0f26-11e7-8783-330932e2f352.html 
[https://perma.cc/RS4T-ZY95]. 
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Jeffrey Brown argues that structural reparations designed to 
facilitate “internal cultural repair” should take priority over litigation-
centered strategies intended to compensate individuals for their losses, 
due to the need to heal a damaged collective psyche that has 
internalized years of social stigma.479 Emma Coleman Jordan, similarly 
focused on the need for mental and perceptional change, urges the 
reparations movement to create an intellectual challenge to the history 
of racism.480 For example, she suggests re-positioning Blacks in history 
from economic parasites to unjustly deprived contributors.481 
Brown and Jordan agree that reparations for slavery achieved 
through litigation would have a very limited capacity to lead to 
meaningful repair, in part because this type of relief necessarily focuses 
on individuals directly descended from slaves.482 However, reparations 
that make no distinctions between, on the one hand, direct victims of 
slavery and their descendants and, on the other hand, Blacks without 
ancestral connections to slavery, may also be problematic.483  
Reparations that seek to uplift entire communities are 
rehabilitative. Reparations that attempt to make direct victims whole are 
compensatory. For example, a scholarship fund set up for a victim’s 
family members would be compensatory. If, however, the fund is 
available to the victim’s entire community, it is rehabilitative. Similarly, 
the construction of memorials or museums is rehabilitative because it 
 
 479. Jeffery M. Brown, Deconstructing Babel: Toward a Theory of Structural Reparations, 
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 463, 470–71 (2004). 
 480. Emma Coleman Jordan, The Non-Monetary Value of Reparations Rhetoric, 6 AFR.-
AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 21, 21–24 (2004) [hereinafter Jordan, Non-Monetary Value]; see also 
Emma Coleman Jordan, A History Lesson: Reparations for What?, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 557, 559 (2003) [hereinafter Jordan, History Lesson] (arguing that reparations efforts 
should focus on lynching and race riots instead of slavery because of their closer temporal 
proximity to the present). 
 481. Jordan, Non-Monetary Value, supra note 480, at 21–24; see also Jordan, A History 
Lesson, supra note 480, at 559. 
 482. See Brown, supra note 479, at 502–03; Jordan, Non-Monetary Value, supra note 480 at 
24.  
 483. David C. Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to Transitional Justice: Reparations as Tools 
of Extraordinary Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1043, 1062 (2010) (“Reparations provided to a 
group as a whole fail to distinguish among former victims, providing benefits to all members 
without regard to the degree of harm suffered, potentially even benefitting some who did not 
suffer at all or who are themselves implicated in abuses.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 
1064 (“Perhaps more troubling is that beneficiaries may again and forever be identified as 
victims, denying full autonomy to individuals and the authority of identity creation to groups. 
For example, Justice Clarence Thomas, among others, has argued that affirmative action 
should be abandoned because it casts a shadow over the accomplishments of all African 
Americans and marks blacks as victims, incapable of succeeding on their individual merits.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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does not involve direct payments to individuals.484 Affirmative action is 
another form of rehabilitative reparations because it is available to any 
community member.485 
The determination of who deserves reparations is highly 
controversial. The complexity of this issue reveals itself most sharply in 
the debate over affirmative action. This form of reparations extends to 
individuals, regardless of ancestry.486 In the Black community, this 
grouping of all Blacks into one social identity causes some individuals, 
including, and perhaps most famously, Justice Clarence Thomas, to 
assert that affirmative action stigmatizes Blacks and undermines the 
meritocracy upon which Thomas and others believe American 
institutions should be based.487 Proponents of affirmative action counter 
this complaint with the contention that opportunity is more important 
than stigmatization and thus a valuable trade-off.488 They also assert that 
American educational and other institutions operate within racist 
hierarchical structures and are therefore not in fact meritocratic, even 
absent affirmative action.489 
Other critics of affirmative action observe that employers and 
educational institutions primarily use it to benefit wealthy, recent 
immigrants without strong ancestral ties to slavery490 or to admit or hire 
 
 484. Id. 
 485. See ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A MODEL FOR BLACK 
REPARATIONS 259 (2004) (stating that affirmative action beneficiaries need not be victims of 
past government discrimination).  
 486. See Brown, supra note 479, 499–510. 
 487. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 488. Affirmative Action: Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 7, 2014), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/education/affirmative-action-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/E5MS-
BPL2]. See generally AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHO SUPPORTS AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION?, https://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file670_37287.pdf [https://perma.cc
/W4A3-UNYV] (detailing the various institutions and individuals that support affirmative 
action). 
 489. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CIVIL RIGHTS DATA 
COLLECTION: DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1–3 (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about
/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVT5-29FR] (supplying 
statistics demonstrating higher rates of discipline, suspension, etc., among Black students); 
Jeff Nesbit, Institutional Racism Is Our Way of Life, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 6, 2015, 
1:16 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/at-the-edge/2015/05/06/institutional-racism-is-
our-way-of-life [https://perma.cc/58EX-VSDM] (citing studies and reports by the American 
Psychological Association, the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, NPR, 
and others, asserting institutional racism’s survival in modern American school systems). 
 490. See, e.g., Javier E. David, How Immigration Distorts Affirmative Action Policy: 
Academic, CNBC (Feb. 14, 2015, 12:03 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/14/tion-distorts-
affirmative-action-policy-academic.html [https://perma.cc/6CVH-BLMM]; Lloyd Green, How 
Affirmative Action Became an Upper-Middle Class Benefit, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 7, 2013, 4:45 
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White-looking biracial or mixed-race individuals who often do not suffer 
from discrimination to the same extent as Blacks with darker skin or 
more African features.491 Extensive literature documents, however, that 
people of color living in the United States generally suffer from 
discrimination, regardless of their economic class, connections to 
slavery, or specific physical characteristics.492  
Another problematic aspect of affirmative action is the way in 
which it groups all Whites as perpetrators. This classification challenges 
accepted understandings of individual, not collective, responsibility. 
Further, dividing perpetrators and victims by race calls for racial 
categorization, an exercise that is not only often inaccurate, but also 
suggests that race is biological, although an overwhelming body of 
medical and scientific research establishes that it is not.493 
Despite the complexities of the reparations movement, most of its 
proponents agree that acknowledgment and apology alone do not suffice 
to compensate for past harms.494 On the contrary, expressions of regret 
usually appear empty when unaccompanied by acts that give life to the 
words. A gesture of goodwill is therefore necessary to signify a sincere 
attempt at repair. The act or gesture should embody either a 
compensatory or a rehabilitative approach to reparations. 
 
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/07/how-affirmative-action-became-an-
upper-middle-class-benefit.html [https://perma.cc/9P3X-84CC]. 
 491. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1705, 1709 (2000); Angela P. Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism 
in the New Century, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 52, 54 (2008); Trina Jones, Intra-
Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 657, 658–59 (2010). 
 492. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
946, 952 n.28 (2002); Christian Sundquist, Critical Praxis, Spirit Healing and Community 
Activism: Preserving a Subversive Dialogue on Reparations, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
659, 671 (2003) (arguing that reparations must focus on the community, which must itself 
recognize its group injuries and need for remedies). Furthermore, “African-American 
reparations claims have not succeeded because a successful Black reparations claim has the 
potential to undermine white privilege and the existing structures of political power, as well as 
producing monetary liability that could literally bankrupt the nation.” Sundquist, supra, at 690 
(citing Yamamoto, supra note 460, at 493). Additionally, “it is vital that the reparations 
movement seek to improve the conditions for all Black people in America, and not solely 
those Black Americans that are able to establish a historical connection to American slavery.” 
Id. at 695. 
 493. See GUY P. HARRISON, RACE AND REALITY: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW 
ABOUT OUR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 21 (2010); RACE: THE POWER OF AN ILLUSION 
(California Newsreel 2003); Agustín Fuentes, Race Is Real, But Not in the Way Many People 
Think, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 9, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/busting-
myths-about-human-nature/201204/race-is-real-not-in-the-way-many-people-think [https://
perma.cc/YVG9-GLJN]. 
 494. Roy L. Brooks, Age of Apology, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH 3, 3–11 (Roy L. 
Brooks, ed. 1999). 
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Compensatory restitution seeks to make up for the losses of individual 
victims or their families.495 Rehabilitative reparations, on the other hand, 
strive to build up harmed communities.496 As such, they avoid the 
challenges of identifying direct descendants of victims and recognize that 
the structural inequalities created and perpetuated by legal, social, and 
business practices affect all people of color in the United States, 
regardless of their lineage. 
Reparations scholar Roy Brooks explains that 
reparations	.	.	.	directed toward the individual victim or the 
victim’s family	.	.	.	are intended to be compensatory, but only in a 
symbolic sense; for nothing can truly return the victim to the 
status quo ante. In contrast, rehabilitative reparations are directed 
toward the victim’s community. They are designed to benefit the 
victim’s group, to nurture the group’s self-empowerment and, 
thus, aid in the nation’s social and cultural transformation.497 
The effectiveness and appropriateness of these types of reparations 
depend in part on the entity that bestows them. For instance, apologies 
from corporations likely carry little restorative power as they could 
easily reflect a desire to enhance a company’s professional reputation, 
not a genuine attempt to transfer profits derived from slavery or other 
wrong acts to those harmed by them. Instead, corporate apologies often 
appear to be acts of self-defense intended to restore a company’s 
legitimacy and maintain the appearance of goodwill.498 
 
 495. BROOKS, supra note 485, at 156 (2004).  
 496. See id.; J. ANGELO CORLETT, HEIRS OF OPPRESSION 231 (2010); Roy L. Brooks, 
Getting Reparations for Slavery Right: A Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 251, 270 (2004); Gray, supra note 483, at 1063–64 (“[G]roup-based reparations must 
confront the twin concerns of essentialism and perpetuating a culture of victimhood. Paying 
reparations to a group ignores differences among individuals in the beneficiary group. So 
doing risks reifying and perhaps providing renewed legitimacy to the lines of opposition 
implicated in past abuses.” (citations omitted)); Natsu Taylor Saito, Rebellious Lawyering in 
the Courts of the Conqueror: The Legacy of the Hirabayashi Coram Nobis Case, 11 SEATTLE 
J. FOR SOC. JUST. 89, 109 (2012) (“The Basic Principles further articulate four dimensions of 
reparations: (1)	restitution, designed to restore the victim as nearly as possible to the position 
they occupied prior to the harm; (2)	compensation for damages that can be economically 
redressed; (3)	rehabilitation, encompassing medical, psychological, social, and legal services; 
and (4)	guarantees that the wrong will not be repeated.” (citations omitted)); Carlton 
Waterhouse, Total Recall: Restoring the Public Memory of Enslaved African-Americans and 
the American System of Slavery Through Rectificatory Justice and Reparations, 14 J. GENDER, 
RACE & JUST. 703, 711 (2011). See generally SHOULD AMERICA PAY? SLAVERY AND THE 
RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003) (collecting historical, 
legal, and other perspectives on reparations for slavery).  
 497. BROOKS, supra note 485, at 156 (2004) (quoting Roy L. Brooks, supra note 494, at 9). 
 498. Janssen, supra note 477, at 19 (citing John B. Hatch, Beyond Apologia: Racial 
Reconciliation and Apologies for Slavery, 70 W.J. COMM. 186 (2006)); see also Keith Michael 
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Wary of these types of self-serving goals, a group of plaintiffs 
brought a suit for damages against a large group of corporations in In re 
African-American Slave Descendants Litigation.499 The plaintiffs argued 
for relief under several different theories.500 One told a simple story of 
unpaid debt: the descendants of slaves should receive the value of slave 
labor from those who stole it.501 From this perspective, Blacks are 
creditors and Whites, represented in this case by wealthy corporations, 
are unjustly enriched debtors.502  
By contrast, the slavery disclosure laws described in the following 
Section, which evolved in response to In re African-American Slave 
Descendants Litigation, are a form of rehabilitative reparations because, 
by requiring businesses to research and make public their past bad acts, 
they seek to uncover truths for the benefit of the community, not 
individuals.503 Further, in addition to setting the historical record 
straight, proponents of these laws hope that disclosures will lead 
corporations to make financial investments into communities.504 The 
proposal to require credit card companies that engage in racial 
discrimination to invest in the communities they harm is also a form of 
rehabilitative reparations because it requires both acknowledgment of 
discriminatory practices and a meaningful effort to repair the harm 
done. 
 
Hearit, “Mistakes Were Made”: Organizations, Apologia, and Crises of Social Legitimacy, 46 
COMM. STUD. 1, 6 (1995). 
 499. 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part, 471 
F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006). For a detailed discussion of the suit, see infra notes 520–52 and 
accompanying text.  
 500. See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d, at 740–42; infra 
notes 515–47 and accompanying text.  
 501. See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 741 (quoting 
Plaintiff’s Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint ¶	305, 310, In re African-Am. Slave 
Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 02-CV-1862(CRN)), ECF No. 
157); RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 207 (2000). 
 502. See Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black 
Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 436 (1998). 
 503. Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1181, 1185–89 (2004); see also, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §	2-92-585 (2016), http://
library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/chicago_il/title2citygovernmentandadministration
/chapter2-92departmentofpurchasescontract?f=templates$fn=altmain-nf.htm$q=[field%20folio-
destination-name:%272-92-585%27]$x=Advanced#JD_2-92-585 [https://perma.cc/X65L-NG8T 
(staff-uploaded archive)] (“Each contractor with whom the city enters into a contract, whether 
subject to competitive bid or not, must complete an affidavit verifying that the contractor has 
searched any and all records of the company or any predecessor company regarding records 
of investments or profits from slavery or slaveholder insurance policies during the slavery 
era.”).  
 504. See infra notes 528–35 and accompanying text.  
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C. Slavery Disclosure Laws 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, several cities and states 
introduced slavery disclosure laws that arose out of a multi-faceted 
strategy to compensate for and acknowledge the harms inflicted by 
slavery.505 Initially, reparations advocates focused their efforts solely on 
government compensation, in recognition of the legal and political 
infrastructure that supported slavery and continued its legacy after its 
abolition.506 After a series of attempts to receive official reparations 
failed, however, in the 2000s, activists turned their attention to 
corporations, seeking to divest them of profits gained through slavery 
and to compel community investments by these companies designed to 
bring Blacks closer to the social and financial positions they would hold 
absent the legacy of slavery.507 
The quest for restitution from corporations began as a series of 
lawsuits, directed at a variety of corporate entities.508 Reparations 
activist Deadria Farmer-Paellmann selected the first defendant, Aetna 
insurance company, based on the results of her investigation revealing 
that Aetna had issued policies on slaves’ lives.509 These insurance 
policies reduced or eliminated slaveholders’ financial risk of loaning out 
their slaves for dangerous work in mines and on railroads, 
simultaneously increasing the slaves’ exposure to physical harm, abuse, 
and death.510 Inspired by Farmer-Paellmann’s research, the Restitution 
Study Group (“RSG”) formed to investigate additional connections 
 
 505. See Jason Levy, Note, Slavery Disclosure Laws: For Financial Reparations or for 
“Telling the Truth?”, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 468, 472–73 (2009). 
 506. See id. at 474–77. 
 507. Id. at 477.  
 508. Id. 
 509. See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 738 (N.D. Ill. 
2005); Janssen, supra note 477, at 24. 
 510. See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 738; James Cox, 
Insurance Firms Issued Slave Policies, USA TODAY (Feb. 21, 2002), http://usatoday30
.usatoday.com/money/general/2002/02/21/slave-insurance-policies.htm [https://perma.cc/4QS6-
5U8Y] (“Early in the 19th century, insurance companies debated whether to insure slaves as 
property—like work animals and buildings—or as human beings. Increasingly, owners renting 
their slaves out to mines, railroads and tobacco processors wanted to protect their 
investments. Insurers eventually began issuing one-year life policies at comparatively pricey 
premiums that reflected the dangerous nature of the slaves’ work.	.	.	. In 1847, the owners of 
Robert Moody insured his life with Nautilus Insurance, which later changed its name to New 
York Life. A handwritten note on the policy says he was hired out to work at the Clover Hill 
Pits, a coal mine near Richmond. Evidence of 10 more New York Life slave policies comes 
from an 1847 account book kept by the company’s Natchez, Miss., agent, W.A. Britton. The 
book, part of a collection at Louisiana State University, contains Britton’s notes on slave 
policies he wrote for amounts ranging from $375 to $600. A 1906 history of New York Life 
says 339 of the company’s first 1,000 policies were written on the lives of slaves.”).  
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between corporations’ wealth-seeking actions and slavery.511 These 
studies “focused on benefits corporations had gained from slavery by 
collecting duties and fees on slave ships, lending money to slave traders 
and on the exploitation of slave labor.”512 This labor reportedly 
amounted to three billion dollars by 1860 and contributed significantly 
to the construction of buildings, streets, and railroads and the 
productivity of cotton and tobacco fields.513 
The media attention that the RSG’s work received contributed to 
the enactment of the first slavery disclosure law in California in 2000.514 
This law requires insurance companies operating in the state that have 
past connections to slavery to join the State Slavery Insurance Registry 
or face penalties.515 It also requires the state insurance commissioner to 
obtain all records of slaveholder insurance policies issued by predecessor 
corporations.516 The City of Chicago followed suit in 2002, with a more 
expansive version of California’s law.517 Thanks to the advocacy of civil 
rights activist and alderperson Dorothy Wright Tillman, Chicago’s law 
requires disclosure of past slavery-related activities by all organizations 
conducting business with the city, not just insurance companies.518 
 Based on the success of the Aetna suit, reparations activists 
targeted seventeen different corporate entities around the country with 
similar complaints.519 Defendants included companies representing the 
financial, tobacco, textile, railroad, and insurance industries.520 The 
 
 511. Janssen, supra note 477, at 25. 
 512. Id.  
 513. Id. 
 514. Act of Sept. 29, 2000, ch. 934, 200 Cal. Sess. Laws 6971, 6971–72 (codified at CAL. INS. 
CODE §	13810 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2017 Reg. Sess.)); Janssen, supra note 477, at 
25. 
 515. CAL. INS. CODE §§	13811–13812 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); 
Janssen, supra note 477, at 25. 
 516. CAL. INS. CODE §	13812; Janssen, supra note 477, at 14. 
 517. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §	2-92-585 (2016), http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll
/Illinois/chicago_il/title2citygovernmentandadministration/chapter2-92departmentofpurc
hasescontract?f=templates$fn=altmain-nf.htm$q=[field%20folio-destination-name:%272-92-
585%27]$x=Advanced#JD_2-92-585 [https://perma.cc/X65L-NG8T (staff-uploaded archive)]; 
Janssen, supra note 477, at 25. 
 518. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §	2-92-585, http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois
/chicago_il/title2citygovernmentandadministration/chapter2-92departmentofpurchasescontract?f
=templates$fn=altmain-nf.htm$q=[field%20folio-destination-name:%272-92-585%27]$x
=Advanced#JD_2-92-585 [https://perma.cc/X65L-NG8T (staff-uploaded archive)]; Janssen, 
supra note 477, at 25. 
 519. First Consolidated and Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, In re African-Am. 
Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 02-CV-1862 (CRN)), 
ECF No. 58; Janssen, supra note 477, at 25. 
 520. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2005); 
Janssen, supra note 477, at 32–33 n.3 (“These defendants included Aetna, JP Morgan, 
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federal court consolidated these lawsuits into In re African-American 
Slave Descendants Litigation in the Northern District of Illinois.521 The 
complaint sought relief based on both the companies’ exploitation of 
slaves for profit and their attempts to deceive the public by covering up 
their misdeeds.522 For example, in regard to the prominent bank 
FleetBoston (now part of Bank of America), plaintiffs alleged,  
FleetBoston, through its predecessor bank, made loans to slave 
traders and also collected custom duties and fees on ships engaged 
in the slave trade. Plaintiffs further alleged that “FleetBoston 
engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise so that the 
Plaintiffs and others similarly situated would not be aware of the 
existence of this enterprise,” and	.	.	.	“made various misleading 
statements to the Press from March 2000 to February 2002, 
attempting to disassociate its predecessor company from its 
current company.”523  
Similarly, the suit against private bank Brown Brothers Harriman 
alleged that it had “loaned millions directly to planters, merchants and 
cotton brokers throughout the South” in addition to owning “at least 
two cotton plantations totaling 4,614 acres and the plantations’ 346 
slaves” and had attempted to conceal these facts.524 
The injuries laid out in the complaint encompassed many aspects of 
structural social inequality that plaintiffs traced back to slavery. 
Specifically, the complaint asserted that defendants’ actions in support 
of slavery collectively led African Americans to trail significantly behind 
Whites in the areas of wealth accumulation, income, literacy, education, 
and life expectancy, while experiencing increased incarceration, 
 
American International Group (AIG), Lloyd’s of London, New York Life Insurance 
Company, Southern Mutual Insurance Company, FleetBoston, Bank of America, AFSA Data 
Corporation, Brown Brothers Harriman, Bank One, Lehman Brothers, RJ Reynolds Tobacco 
Company, Brown and Williamson, Liggett Group Inc., Loews Corporation (Lorrilard), 
Canadian National Railway, CSX Corporation, Norfolk Southern Corp., and Union Pacific 
Railroad. Similar litigations were filed in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, North and South 
Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.”). 
 521. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2005), 
aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part, 471 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 522. See id. at 768–69. 
 523. Id. at 738 (citation omitted). Regarding CSX railway corporation, “[p]laintiffs allege 
that CSX ‘is a successor-in-interest to numerous predecessor railroad lines that were 
constructed or run, at least in part, by slave labor.’	.	.	. Plaintiffs further allege that ‘CSX 
engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise as the plaintiffs and others similarly situated 
would not be aware of the existence of this enterprise,’ and, in more recent times, ‘withheld 
information or made a misleading statement to the Press regarding their participation in and 
profiting from slavery.’	” Id. at 738 (citations omitted).  
 524. Id. at 738. 
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victimization, death penalty sentencing, and single-parent upbringings.525 
It alleged that plaintiffs lacked  
the same opportunities as	.	.	.	their white 
contemporaries;	.	.	.	[must] overcome barriers to their human right 
to development which their white contemporaries [need] 
not;	.	.	.	suffer irreparable psychological damage from the loss of 
their history, language and culture; [and do not] know the actual 
birth names of	.	.	.	their forbearers and, consequently, to this day 
do not know their own real names.526  
The remedies that plaintiffs sought included an accounting of the 
“monies, profits, and/or benefits derived by defendants” from their 
participation in activities related to slavery, “a constructive trust in the 
value of said monies, profits, and/or benefits,	.	.	.	full restitution in the 
value of all monies, profits, and/or benefits derived by defendants’ use of 
slave labor,” and “	‘equitable disgorgement’ of these ‘monies, profits, 
and/or benefits.	.	.	.’	”527 
 
 525. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss 
the Second Amended and Consolidated Complaint at 1–2, In re African-Am. Slave 
Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 1:02-CV-07764), ECF No. 161; see also 
In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. at 738. The complaint asserted that  
the practice of slavery has caused the following specific social inequities: twenty-six 
(26) percent of African-Americans in the United States live in poverty compared to 
eight (8) percent of whites.	.	.	. 14.7 percent of African-Americans	have four-year 
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While this litigation ran its course in the courts, activists put 
pressure on the defendant corporations to settle and make restitution 
directly to the Black community.528 Several organizations, church 
leaders, and politicians supported these campaigns,529 which included 
boycotts against JPMorgan student loans and insurance policies from 
Aetna and New York Life.530 JPMorgan and Wachovia subsequently 
issued public apologies for the companies’ past ties to slavery.531 Aetna 
also apologized,532 and established a minority internship program and 
diversity scholarship fund.533 JPMorgan similarly created a five million 
dollar scholarship fund for Black students in Louisiana.534  
Farmer-Paellmann also sought restitution from corporations, 
through letters she wrote to thirteen corporations that had ties to 
slavery. She requested that they finance a historical commission to 
examine slavery, and set up an “interim humanitarian fund” for the 
health, education, and development of African Americans.535 
Ultimately, the courts did not award plaintiffs damages in the 
reparations cases, due to a number of challenges facing reparations 
lawsuits generally, including: statutes of limitations; the difficulty of 
identifying directly harmed individuals; the absence of individual 
perpetrators; the lack of direct causation; and the indeterminacy of 
compensation amounts.536 Courts likely also disfavored these suits 
 
 528. Janssen, supra note 477, at 26. 
 529. Id. at 26 (citing Diane Levick, Aetna Facing Boycott Threat: Reparations Group 
Demands Trust Fund That Would Benefit Slaves’ Descendants, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 
15, 2006), http://articles.courant.com/2006-11-15/business/0611150453_1_deadria-farmer-
paellmann-reparations-descendants [https://perma.cc/E3T6-U6PB]). 
 530. Conal Walsh, JP Morgan Faces Boycott over Slave Trade Reparations, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 10, 2005), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2005/dec/11/usnews.theobserver 
[https://perma.cc/K4BL-NAZF]. 
 531. Diane Levick, Aetna Facing Boycott Threat: Reparations Group Demands Trust Fund 
That Would Benefit Slaves’ Descendants, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 15, 2006), http://articles
.courant.com/2006-11-15/business/0611150453_1_deadria-farmer-paellmann-reparations-
descendants [https://perma.cc/E3T6-U6PB]; Walsh, supra note 530. 
 532. Janssen, supra note 477, at 26–29. 
 533. BROOKS, supra note 485, at 15. 
 534. JP MORGAN CHASE & CO., ANNUAL REPORT 2005 12 (2005) https://www
.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document/ar05_complete.pdf [https://perma
.cc/J45W-FLU4] (stating plans to expand the Smart Start scholarship program to Louisiana); 
John Carlisle, Slave Disclosure Shakedowns, AM. SPECTATOR (Feb. 18, 2005, 4:07 AM), http://
spectator.org/articles/48951/slave-disclosure-shakedowns [https://perma.cc/89DQ-7YUU]. 
 535. James Cox, Aetna, CSX, FleetBoston Face Slave Reparation Suit, USA TODAY (Mar. 
24, 2002, 10:11 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/general/2002/03/25/slave-
reparations.htm [https://perma.cc/MJ2U-P25K]. 
 536. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 780–81 (N.D. Ill. 
2005). See Yamamoto et al., supra note 205, at 24–27; David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why 
Reparations for Blacks Is a Bad Idea for Blacks—And Racist Too, FRONTPAGEMAG (Jan. 3, 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2017) 
1156 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
because of the relatively low moral culpability of corporations, 
compared to long-deceased individual slaveholders or the government, 
which was not available as a defendant due to sovereign immunity.537 On 
the other hand, many individuals have fewer reservations about suing 
corporations than the descendants of slave-owners, whom they view as 
innocent in comparison.538 
Despite plaintiffs’ loss, however, the court expressed its openness to 
the possibility of liability based on consumer fraud and protection 
resulting from corporations’ failure to disclose slavery dealings.539 
Therefore, although plaintiffs did not win on this theory, it may have 
opened the door to wider acceptance of and advocacy for slavery 
disclosure legislation.  
In any case, it is likely that plaintiffs did not envision a victory in 
court. Traditionally, reparations plaintiffs have sought settlements, with 
the additional goals of raising awareness of the lingering effects of 
slavery, and building political pressure for legislation. By that measure, 
the suits were a success. The City of Los Angeles540 and State of Iowa541 
passed slavery disclosure laws in 2003. Detroit542 and Philadelphia543 
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followed in 2004, as did San Francisco544 in 2006. There are also slavery 
disclosure laws on the books in Berkeley,545 Chicago,546 Milwaukee,547 
Oakland,548 Maryland,549 Illinois,550 and California.551 
Despite their expansion, the somewhat limited reach of slavery 
disclosure laws precludes them from providing true and full restitution 
for the harms of slavery. Nonetheless, they accomplish several important 
goals. First, they generate public recognition of corporations’ complicity 
with slavery and the moral wrong that their involvement represented. 
Second, they forge important connections between past exploitation and 
present corporate wealth, contributing to the movement that seeks to 
resist collective forgetting.552 Third, they have the potential to lead to 
substantial investments into communities by corporations, even when 
these companies have not broken the laws.553 Therefore, even though 
these laws are weak in the sense that they carry penalties only for failure 
to disclose, they can be effective rehabilitative tools. They also provide a 
useful model for regulation of harms related to slavery, such as racial 
discrimination in the credit card industry. 
Clearly, racial discrimination by credit card companies is not the 
moral equivalent of slavery. Nonetheless, the economic and racial 
inequality that the credit card companies’ predatory practices produce 
and the lack of resistance to them represent vestiges of slavery. Also, 
unlike past ties to slavery, which are merely censured and sometimes 
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excused, racial discrimination is illegal. The current legal regime, 
however, fails to penalize or prevent it effectively.  
CONCLUSION 
Regulatory reform of the credit card industry is essential to protect 
consumers from exploitative practices that have dire consequences. 
Unfortunately, however, the powerful influence that some banks and 
other credit lending institutions have on Congress has heretofore 
disabled most serious attempts to shield consumers from companies’ 
predatory tactics. Approximately $11.6 million of the political action 
committee money given to the 2016 federal electoral candidates came 
from finance and credit card companies.554 The size of these 
contributions suggests the existence of regulatory capture that is 
difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge. 
Consumer advocacy is a target of the Trump administration. In 
January 2017, Republicans threatened to dismantle the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, based largely on its lack of accountability 
to elected officials.555 To this end, an executive order called for a report 
on the efficacy of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Act, putting its continued existence into doubt.556 
It is therefore appealing to consider remedies to this problem that 
do not require increased regulation or financial sacrifice by the 
corporations, such as financial education for consumers. But, although 
there is no doubt that every individual can benefit from full information 
regarding smart financial choices, consumer education cannot replace 
structural reform as a gateway to reducing financial and credit 
disparities. Realistically, even an individual armed with the best 
information possible cannot control the effects of structural, 
institutionalized discrimination. 
Another argument against stronger regulation of credit card 
companies is that these companies will respond by ceasing to lend to the 
communities they currently exploit, forcing them into even more dire 
financial constraints or exploitative lending conditions. This outcome is 
highly unlikely, however, because of the high profit margin in subprime 
lending. Therefore, even with a reduction in opportunities to 
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discriminate, credit card companies will most likely continue to issue 
cards to borrowers who make monthly payments, regardless of the 
amount of those payments. 
A significant obstacle to achieving meaningful reform in this area is 
that it requires a major cultural shift. Social perceptions, shaped by a 
steady diet of popular culture and media, infiltrate individuals’ daily 
lives. The stories they hear and the corresponding stereotypes they 
embrace inform their financial decisions and transactions, in addition to 
their perceptions of equality and justice. Social movements have always 
been at the forefront of major changes in the law, such as the Civil 
Rights Act and the Supreme Court cases recognizing marriage 
equality.557 Occupy Wall Street began a conversation about economic 
equality that, perhaps fatally, failed to link its struggle to racial 
equality.558 An intersectional movement that understands the connection 
between different forms of oppression is therefore necessary to guide 
legal reform. 
From a much broader perspective, it may be unrealistic to try to 
solve this problem from within the system. Perhaps it is a mistake to 
strive for reform instead of revolution.559 To function, capitalism relies 
on economic winners and losers, and systemic, structural racism 
identifies and perpetuates a racial class of losers that serves an essential 
role in this economic model. It is possible that only by imagining and 
adopting a completely new economic system can the law eliminate 
racism in the consumer credit industry or in any other sector.  
This powerful vision surfaces in the critically acclaimed television 
show Mr. Robot, where masses take to the streets to celebrate after 
hackers infiltrate the world’s largest bank and erase all consumer debt.560 
This may be the utopia for which we must strive. Until that moment, any 
social critique that focuses on the actions of the consumer instead of the 
credit card companies misguidedly redirects a conversation about 
structural inequality and exploitation to one about personal choices.  
It is the role of the law to protect consumers from exploitation and 
discrimination. In the context of consumer credit, the law has failed to 
do so. Adopting disclosure and investment requirements for credit card 
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companies would signal to consumers and corporations alike that the 
law will not tolerate predatory practices, and significantly raise the 
standards for corporate and social practice in the United States. 
